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I. Introduction
Tort law in America has long been in the middle of a philosophical tug
of war between exponents of federalization and protectors of unique state
interests. On one hand, ever since the days of Swift v. Tyson,' proponents of
* Professor of Law, Arizona State University College of Law. I would like to thank my
students, Meghan Wharton, Jerod Tufle, and Matthew Kaufman, for their research assistance
and Barbara Atwood, Michael Berch, Bob Clinton, David Kaye, and Michael Saks for their
valuable comments on drafts of this Article and discussions of its subject matter.
1. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1(1842).
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uniformity and protection of commercial interests have advocated the federalization of tort law. Today, numerous bills that recently have been passed to
federalize important aspects of tort law reflect the arguments of these proponents.2 Most recently, in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks,
Congress swiftly passed the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, which creates a federal strict liability cause of action for all property
and personal injury claims that result from the September 11 terrorist attacks
and limits airline liability to the extent of their liability insurance coverage.3

In 2001, Congress began writing the first comprehensive federal standards for
health insurance. The House and Senate passed separate versions of the Pa-

tients' Bill of Rights, which provided for an expansion ofpatients' right to sue
their health plans in state courts while capping damages for pain and suffering
2. See, e.g., The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb
(2000) (requiring class actions of fifty or more people regarding certain federal securities
lawsuits to be filed in federal court); The Year 2000 Information and Readiness Disclosure Act,
15 U.S.C. § 6601 (2000) (setting many new procedural, factual, and notice requirements for
plaintiffs claiming damages from year 2000 failure); The Biomaterials Access Assurance Act
of 1998, 21 U.S.C. § 1605 (2000) (exempting suppliers of raw materials and component parts
for implantable medical devices from certain tort suits); The Small Business Job Protection Act
of 1996, 26 U.S.C. § 104 (2000) (declaring that punitive damages and damages for emotional
distress are taxable income); The Bill Emerson Good Samaritan Food Donation Act of 1996,
42 U.S.C. § 1791 (2000) (protecting food donors from most civil suits); The Coast Guard
Authorization Act of 1996, 46 U.S.C. § 183 (2000) (limiting medical malpractice liability of
cruise ship operators); The Volunteer Protection Act of 1997, 42 U.S.C. § 14503 (2000)
(limiting immunity for volunteers for nonprofit organizations, creating national standard of
punitive damages, and removing joint liability for noneconomic damages); The Aviation
Disaster Family Assistance Act of 1996, 49 U.S.C. § 1136 (2000) (prohibiting lawyers and
insurance representatives from contacting survivors or families of plane crash victims for thirty
days from date of crash); Amtrak Record and Accountability Act of 1997, 49 U.S.C. § 28103
(2000) (capping Amtrak's tort liability at $200 million for each rail accident and creating
standard for punitive damages awards); The General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, 49
U.S.C. § 40101 (2000) (setting eighteen-year statute of repose for small aircraft and aircraft
parts).
3. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-42
(2001). Title IV of the Act creates a compensation program for any individual who was killed
or physically injured as a result of the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001.
Id. § 403. A claimant seeking compensation must file a claim with a Special Master appointed
by the Attorney General. Id. § 405(a)(1). When evaluating the claim, the Special Master shall
not consider negligence or any other theory and must make a determination on the claim within
120 days. Id. § 405(bX3). No punitive damage awards are allowed. Id. § 405(b)(5). In
submitting a claim, the claimant waives the right to file a civil action. Id. § 405(cX3)(BXi).
Other federal protections have been given to the World Trade Center, the Boeing Corporation, which manufactured the planes involved, the operators of Logan, Newark, and Dallas
Airports, as well as New York City. Aviation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, §§ 201(a)(1),(3)
(2001); see Sept. 11 LawsRaise FearsofTortReform, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 3,2001, atAl [hereinafter
Sept. 11 Laws] (discussing whether September 11 laws may lead to slippery slope in tort reform).
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and punitive damages.4 In addition, the Common Sense Product Liability Legal
Reform Act of 19965 avoided enactment only by a presidential veto.
At the same time, several commentators have proposed that state law
should give way to national tort law to help federal courts cope with everincreasing numbers of mass tort cases.6 Others have called for consolidated
federal proceedings7 or federalized choice of law for mass tort litigation s to
achieve the same effect.9 Legislators have proposed several bills that would
4. H.R. 2563, 107th Cong. (2001); S.1052, 107th Cong. (2001). Patient protections in
the two bills are nearly identical, but the means of enforcing those rights are different. The
Senate bill gives patients a much more extensive right to sue health plans for injuries caused by
the denial of care. The only limits on suits in the Senate bill are those provided under current
state law. S.1052, 107th Cong. § 402(aX3) (2001). Both versions set limits on punitive
damages, with the House version also limiting the amount recoverable for pain and suffering.
H.R. 2563, 107th Cong. § 402(aX4XA) (2001).
5. H.R. 956, 104th Cong. (1996). This legislation would have capped punitive damage
awards at the greater of $250,000 or twice the plaintiff's compensatory damages award, abolished joint liability for noneconomic damages, limited the liability of product sellers, established
a complete defense to liability if the principal cause of the accident was the plaintiff's use of
alcohol or illegal drugs, reduced liability if misuse or alteration of a product was the principal
cause of the accident, and set a fifteen-year statute of repose in litigation involving workplace
durable goods. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-481 (1996) (presenting disagreements and
compromises between House and Senate regarding product liability reform).
6. See JACKB.WEINSTEININDIVIDUALJUSTICEINMAgS TORTLITIGATION: THE EFFECT
OF CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOuDATIONS AND OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES 4, 21, 146 (1995)
(suggesting need for federal tort law); Robert M. Ackerman, Tort Law and Federalism:
Whatever Happened to Devolution?, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 429, 451-56 (1996) (arguing for
presumption against fedealization of tort law, which would be overcome in products liability
cases); Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A. Behrens, A Proposalfor FederalProduct Liability
Reform in the New Millennium, 4 TEX. REV. L. & PoL. 261,277-99 (2000) (advocating federalization of products liability law, including rules surrounding intoxicated users, fair treatment
of sellers, statutes of repose, punitive damages, and joint and several liability); see also Charles
T. Kimmett, Rethinking Mass Tort Law 105 YALE L.J. 1713, 1714 (1996) (book review)
(discussing Judge Weinstein's call for national tort law); Georgine Vairo, Multi-Tort Cases:
Causefor More Darknesson the Subject, or a New Rolefor Federal Common Law, 54 FoRDHAM L. REv. 167, 223-24 (1985) (arguing for federal common law); Robert W. Kasten Jr. &
Gene Kimmelman, Is It Time for a Uniform ProductLiability Law?, A.B.A. J., May 1985, at
38 (discussing merits of uniform federal product liability law).
7. SeeFED. JUDICIALCTR., MANUALFORCOMPeXLITIGATION, 254-55(1995) (discussing advantages for consolidating proceedings from multiple districts); REPORT OF THE FEDERAL
COURTS STUDY COMMrrrEE 44-45 (1990) (discussing economy and efficiency of consolidated
federal proceedings in mass tort and product liability cases).
8. Linda S. Mullenix, FederalizingChoice ofLawforMass-TortLitigation,70 TEX. L.
REV. 1623, 1638 (1992) (discussing why federal common law may be appropriate in mass tort
situations).
9. Judith Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation,"54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 56
(1991) ("The current set of proposals on aggregation use the federal courts as the central forum.
Such centralization will increase federal power and, in the context of mass torts, will shift the
task of developing tort law from state to federal courts.").
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confer jurisdiction on the federal courts to hear many state law class actions
on the basis ofminimal diversity." Some have suggested that federal law, not
state law, should govern punitive damages." Federalization oftort law is also
occurring indirectly, as products increasingly are being regulated at the federal
level, which leaves individual tort suits vulnerable to either a preemption
defense or a defense of regulatory compliance.
Why has this movement occurred that allows federal courts to decide
more tort cases under federal law? Several explanations usually are given.
Many believe that federalizing tort law represents an appealing solution to the
increasingly complex factual and legal issues presented in tort litigation based
on uniformity, predictability, and efficiency arguments. Manufacturers argue
that it will help avoid inconsistent rulings on the same product. Some believe
that state judges and juries unfairly favor in-state plaintiffs against out-of-state
defendants. Others argue that federalization benefits special interest groups
because it is a more efficient way to accomplish their objectives. 2 Most
recently, legislators used the federalization of tort law as a way to save a

national industry as a component of the nation's war against terrorism. 3
Regardless of the motivation, reform advocates seek to create a national
system to displace state tort law. Moreover, it is clear that efforts to enact
federal legislation to direct tort law will continue."
10.

Class Action Fairness Act of 2000, S. 353, H.R. 1875, 106th Cong. (2000).

11.

See Thomas E. Willging, Annotation, Mass Torts ProblemsandProposals: A Report

to the Mass Torts Working Group, 187 F.R.D. 328, 421-25 (1999) (discussing proposals for
federal punitive damages law); Briggs L. Tobin, Comment The "Limited Generosity" Class
Action and a Uniform Choice of Law Rule: An Approach to Fairand Effective Mass-Tort
Punitive DamageAdjudication in the FederalCourts, 38 EMORY L.J. 457,480 (1989) (stating

that "federal court[s] must be free to formulate a neutral, uniform standard of punitive damage
liability to be applied to the entire plaintiff class").
12.

William Marshall,Federalization:A CriticalOverview, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 719,723

(1995). Professor Jonathan R. Macey argues, for example, that the transaction costs of obtaining legislation on the federal level are simply lower than obtaining the passage of fifty state
statutes. Jonathan R. Macey, FederalDeference to Local Regulators andEconomic Theory of
Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265, 271

(1990). Moreover, federal law will always exist in the background even if state legislation
addresses the issue and federal regulators must still be persuaded not to preempt the field later.
Id. at 271-72. Further, federal law is sometimes viewed as a"higher quality product than state
law," id. at 272, and special interest groups seek federalization to stress the importance of the
issue involved. Marshall, supra, at 723 (citing Judith Resnik, "Naturally"Without Gender:
Women, Jurisdiction,and the FederalCourts,66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1682, 1749-50 (1991)).

13. See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 10742 (2001) (establishing compensation program for individuals killed or injured in terroristrelated aircraft crashes of September 11,2001).
14. See, e.g., The Class Action Fairness Act of 2001, H.R. 2341 § 2(b), 107th Cong.
(2001) (seeking to limit power of state courts to adjudicate class actions); The Patients' Bill of
Rights, H.R. 2563 § 402, 107th Cong. (2001) (setting federal civil remedies to provide for lia-
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On the other hand, there is a rich history in this country, with its roots in
the Tenth Amendment and epitomized in the last century by Erie Railroadv.
Tompkins, 5 that seeks to protect the rights of states to govern in matters of
local concern. The Supreme Court's recent attempts to reign in congressional
efforts under the Commerce Clause to regulate in matters that the Court
regards as truly local in nature evidences this history. For example, in United
States v. Lopez,'6 the Court struck down a congressional enactment under the
Commerce Clause for the first time since the New Deal and found that Congress did not have the power to prohibit the possession of guns near schools.17
The Court continued this trend in more recent decisions, most notably by
striking down the civil remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act
in United States v. Morrison.'5 Also, the Court's recent Tenth and Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence urges protection of the "dignity" of the states as
sovereign units. 9 Such was the case, for example, in Alden v. Maine,2" in
which the Court held that Congress could not compel the states to defend
federal claims in state courts, 21 and in Boardof Trustees v. Garrett,2 in which
the Court ruled that state employees could not sue for damages for violations
of the Americans With Disabilities Act.23
This Article examines the most recent chapter in this tug of war by
evaluating the competing considerations that will govern the constitutionality
of modem day tort reform proposals. To put this issue in historical perspective, Part II discusses the Swift-Erie debate that raised many of the same issues
as today's debate over national tort reform. Part III provides a general overview of our system of federalism and notes the changes in the Court's renewed solicitude for state sovereignty. Part IV explores the values of maintaining a federal and state system. Part V examines these values in the context
of tort law. Part VI discusses the foundations oftort law as an area traditionbility of health organizations to plan member or member's estate). Some say that the September
11,2001 terrorist attacks have allowed federal tort reform efforts to be revived. See AddedRush
on Revising Tort System, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 13, 2001, at Cl (describing protections given to
insurance and biotechnology industries, as well as airports, plane manufacturers, World Trade
Center, and New York City from lawsuits stemming from terrorist attacks); SepL 11 Laws,
supra note 3, at Al (same).
15. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
16. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
17. Id. at 567-68.
18. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
19. See infra notes 114-31 and accompanying text (discussing developments in state
sovereignty and relationship between federal and state governments).
20. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
21. Id. at,749-54.
22. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
23. Id. at 366-68.

59 WASH. & LEE L. REV 475 (2002)

ally regulated by the states, along with the paradigms underlying the philosophic understandings of tort law. Finally, Part VII applies the paradigms to
federal tort law, developing a sliding scale model for use in analyzing the
constitutionally of federal tort reform legislation.
The Article concludes that the key to determining whether national tort
reform would pass constitutional muster is to look first at the purpose and
effect of the federal legislation and second at the purpose behind the tort law
it attempts to replace. Under recent federalism jurisprudence, federal legislation passed pursuant to the Commerce Clause power must serve an economic
interest. Even if the federal law meets this test, it still may not be sufficient
to invoke federal power. As the purpose of the displaced tort law is more to
achieve efficiency in the marketplace, the argument becomes stronger for a
substantial, even dominant, role for the Congress in the tort system given its
power to regulate interstate commerce. Furthermore, this increases the
likelihood that federal legislation would be upheld under the recent federalism
decisions. To the extent that the state law in issue enforces moral norms,
however, Congress's power to federalize that law is subject to greater scrutiny
under the recent federalism decisions.
I. An HistoricalPerspective
A. The Swift v. Tyson Decision
Officially, the issue addressed by the Court in Swifl v. Tyson24 was the
meaning of the word "laws" in the Judiciary Act of 1789.25 More specifically,
did the term "laws" include the common law? This was the issue that the Supreme Court focused on almost a century later in Erie Railroadv. Tompkins.26
As many authors have pointed out, the real issue in these decisions was much
larger. Swy? and Erie questioned the federal government's role in protecting
the emerging national businesses from potentially burdensome state law.
There were two main lines of support for Swift, both of which mirror
present-day national tort reform concerns. First, there was a desire for uniformity and predictability, which only a federal law (either statutory or common)
could provide; this, of course, was logically independent of the substance of
the uniform law. Second, there was a desire to promote commerce by means
of a consistently pro-business system of laws. 27
24. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1(1842).
25.
Judiciary Act of 1789 § 34, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000) ("The laws of the several states,
except where the Constitution or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded
as rules of decisions in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.").
26.
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
27.

See MORTON HORwITz, TBE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at

245-52 (1977) (asserting that courts employed judicial powers to promote commercial and
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Even before Swift, businesses preferred to have cases heard in federal
court for several reasons. Businesses generally felt that they would face local
bias if forced to defend themselves in foreign state courts.28 In addition, there
was a perception that federal court interpretations of state common law would
be more favorable to business interests than would be a state court's interpretation of relevant state laws. Also, the Swift decision came at a time when
many common law issues simply had not yet been definitively addressed by
state supreme courts and, therefore, English law provided the source for both
federal and state systems. This gave businesses an incentive to have the more
favorable federal courts decide these novel questions. Finally, federal courts
tended to look for their guidance from other federal courts, which resulted in
a rough uniformity of rulings. These factors, combined with very loose
diversity standards, insured that the federal courts' dockets were heavy with
suits involving commercial issues.29
By 1840, the great divergence between the laws of the states regarding
certain commercial transactions became troublesome. One flashpoint was the
commerce in bills of exchange.3 ° A number of states, including New York,
had departed from the common law principle of unquestioned negotiability.
Mr. Swift, who had obtained a bill under dubious circumstances, unsuccessfully attempted to settle the case, then brought a diversity action in federal
court. The case reached the Supreme Court 1 and the opinion by Justice Story
resulted in the famous Swift doctrine. The Court held that the reliance on state
law required by the Judiciary Act did not extend to cases of a "commercial
nature";32 the applicable law was "to be sought, not in the decisions of local
tribunals, but in the general principles and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence."33 These principles were universal and could be interpreted by anyone,
industrial growth); EDWARD A. PURCELL, BRANDFmS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONsTrurON:
ERiE, THE JuDICIAL POWER, AND THE PoLrncs OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CEN-

TuRYAMERICA 53 (2000) ("The federal courts under Swift... [established] a nationally uniform
common law that would facilitate interstate commerce in the burgeoning national market.").
28. This is the reason for which Congress provided diversity jurisdiction in the first place
in order to guard against local partisanship. PURCELL, supranote 27, at 65.
29. Id. at 79 ("[Corporate defendants] were involved in 75 percent of all diversity cases
and 87 percent of all removed diversity actions.") (citing Charles E. Clark, Diversity ofCitizenship Jurisdiction of the FederalCourts, 19 ABA. J. 499 (1933)).
30. A bill of exchange is "[a] written order of one party upon another for absolute payment of money to a third or designated person ...upon demand or at a specified or determinable future time." BAu.ENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 136 (3d ed. 1969). This term is synonymous
with the U.C.C. term "draft." Id.
31.
The case reached the Supreme Court twice. The first time before the Court it was
remanded, apparently to develop the record. TONY FREYER, HARMONY AND DISSONANCE: THE
SwLFT AND ERE CASES IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM 13 (1981).

32.
33.

Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 19 (1842).
Id.
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reflecting the Swift-era view ofthe law as the "brooding omnipresence." 4 The
federal judicial system had just as much right as the states to interpret the rule
of law because it was separate from that of the states.
The decision was not merely a neutral one of statutory interpretation.
Justice Story plainly saw uniformity - on the commercial interests' terms - as

critical: "It is for the benefit and convenience ofthe commercial world to give
as wide an extent as practicable to the credit and circulation of negotiable
paper.... The [contrary] doctrine would strike a fatal blow at all discounts of
negotiable securities for pre-existing debts."'35
As a result, Swift perpetuated a dual federal-state system based on
independent interpretations of the same common law.36 Swift was crucial in
federalizing common law and the federal role became even more prominent
in 1855 with Watson v. Tarpley 7 In that case, the Supreme Court held that
the "general principles" of commercial law required by Swift trumped even a
state statute.38 The confusing wording of the Judiciary Act could not justify,
39
Watson's conclusion; a state statute was certainly "the law of the state.1
Rather, to put it in anachronistic terms, Watson was a very broad assertion of
the Dormant Commerce Clause. The law of commerce defined the contractual
rights of nonresidents of a state; therefore, any state law infringing those
rights was invalid. A "state would have no power to impose, and.., the
courts of the United States would be bound to disregard" any such law.4' It
should be noted that the Court did not hold that such a law was unconstitutional either as a violation of the Commerce Clause or as a law impairing the
obligation of contracts; rather, it held that the federal courts could not enforce
it. 4' State courts, in cases involving only state residents, were free to adhere
34.

So. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205,222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).

35. Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 20. Justice Story was a leading authority on negotiable
instruments, having published a treatise on the subject, and saw the case as an opportunity to
"replace the indeterminacy in commercial law with a unified body of rules promulgated by federal
courts that could be broadly applied.- KERMrr L. HALL, TBE MAGIC MIRROR 122, 123 (1989).
36.

EDWARD A. PURCEu,, LrIATION AND INEQuALIrY 59 (1992) ("(W]hen 'state' law

properly controlled a case, as in tort and contract claims heard in diversity actions, federal
judges often ignored the decisions of state courts and applied their independent federal rules

which were in many cases inconsistent with the state rules."). Similarly, state courts refused to
follow federal precedents.
37. 59 U.S. 517 (1855).
38. Cf Green v. Neal's Lessee, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 291 (1832) (stating that interpretation by
state courts of state statute takes precedence over Supreme Court interpretation of state property
law).

39. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 34,28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000).
40. Watson v. Tarpley, 59 U.S. 517, 521 (1855).
41.
Cf Gelpeke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175, 205-07 (1863) (involving
federal actions on defaulted municipal bonds). In Gelpcke, the Supreme Court declined to
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to it. As a result, the nonresidents had the pleasant choice between state law
or the "general" law, whereas residents had only the state law. 42
The principles behind the Swift line of cases extended to tort cases by the
1870s. 43 Through many decisions, federal courts exercised the common law
decision-making authority conferred on them by Swift and erected a number
of barriers to tort recovery in the federal courts. One commentator summed
up this period:
[In the area of torts the] federal common law came in the late nineteenth
century to impose relatively narrow standards of liability. Restricted
standards of care, exacting requirements for establishing causation, and a
capacious idea of the kinds of risks that people properly "assumed" all
combined - particularly in cases of injured employees - to give frequent
advantages to [corporate] defendants.4
These narrow standards of liability imposed on corporate defendants by fed'
eral courts arguably had the effect of "fostering business enterprise."45

Advantages to businesses took several forms, including limited employer
liability.46 For instance, the Supreme Court adopted a strict interpretation of
follow a state court construction of the state constitution that would have invalidated the bonds,
in light of the fact that the construction overruled decisions outstanding at the time the bonds
were issued. Id. at 204-05.
One of my colleagues, Michael Berch, believes that the Swift doctrine flourished because
prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1867, federal courts were powerless to
invalidate state legislation.
42. This, of course, assumes that the requirements of diversity, including the amount in
controversy, were met.
In the end, it was probably this inequality, especially in the taxicab case, which put the
anti-Swift movement over the top. See Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown &
Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 530-31 (1928) (allowing taxicab company to
reincorporate in Tennessee and invoke federal common law to avoid undesired outcome under
Kentucky common law). In Black & White Taxicab, a Kentucky taxicab company was permitted to avoid unfavorable state common law prohibiting exclusive dealing contracts by reincorporating in Tennessee. Id. at 530. The taxicab company invoked the federal common law
permitting such contracts when it brought suit in federal court to enforce the contract. Id. at
522-23. The federal court upheld the contract despite the fact that it would have been invalid
had the company remained incorporated in Kentucky. Id.
43. PURCELL, supranote 36, at 72 ("By the 1870's the federal courts were regularly exercising their independent judgment in tort cases and by the nineteenth century the federal
common law had expanded to include almost the entire law of industrial accidents.").
44. Id. at 73. However, there were exceptions. In some cases the federal courts adopted
broad rules of corporate liability contrary to the law of the state where the injury occurred. For
example, in Washington & Georgetown RR Co. v. Gladmon, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 401,407-08
(1872), and Sioux City &Pac. RR Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657, 660 (1873), the Court
held that infants were held to a different duty of care and caution than adults despite contradictory state law.
45.

PURCELL, supra note 36, at 73.

46.

There are few reported federal tort cases from this time period for two main reasons.
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the fellow-servant rule,47 which was then under attack in a number of state
courts. In several cases, the Court adduced a modem Commerce Clause-type

justification for federal jurisdiction: the liability of a railroad employer (or
remedy of the employee) should not depend upon the fortuitous location of the

train at the time of the accident.4

However, it is clear from the leading

federal tort case in the employer-employee context of the time, Baltimore &
OhioRailroadCo. v. Baugh,49 that tort law, no less than contract law, was part
of the "general law" of commerce and thus beyond the reach of state entities.
The dissent in Baugh complained that the decision had the result - and the

intention - of subverting the states' attempts to reform the common law of
torts in the interests of "justice and humanity."5 0

While the fellow-servant rules provided employers with a broad range of
immunity from suit, two other defenses, contributory negligence and assumption of the risk, also reduced employers' exposure to liability. In Kohn v.
McNulta,5" the Supreme Court held that a railyard employee could not state

a claim against his employer for his injury because he assumed the risk

associated with the work. 2 It was widely believed in the post-Swift era that
First, United States district courts did not make a practice of publishing opinions during this
time period. Second, after a defendant removed a tort case to federal court, factors such as delay
and expense often forced the injured plaintiff to settle. Id. at 49-50.
47. The fellow-servant rule provided that an employer would not be liable for injuries to
employees caused by the acts of fellow employees.
48. See PURCELL, supra note 36, at 24 (stating that nationally consistent common law was
considered "essential to business planning and security").
[I]f the sale of a product of a manufacturer or distributor such as Audi or Volkswagen is not simply an isolated occurrence, but arises from the efforts of the
manufacturer or distributor to serve, directly or indirectly, the market for its product
in other States, it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of those States if its
allegedly defective merchandise has there been the source of injury to its owner or
others.
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,297 (1980).
49.
149 U.S. 368, 378 (1893). In Baugh, a fireman was injured when an engineer negligently drove a train along the wrong section of track and subsequently collided with another
train. Id. at 368. The Court adopted a sweeping interpretation of the fellow-servant rule by
holding that all in the employ of the same employer are fellow servants and that the employer
will not be held liable for injuries caused to any fellow servant. Id. at 384.
50. Id. at 411 (Field, J., dissenting). Excerpts from the dissent were subsequently quoted
by the majority in Erie.
51.
147 U.S. 238 (1893).
52.
Kohn v. McNulto, 147 U.S. 238,241 (1893); see also Chesapeake & Ohio R.R. Co.
v. Hennessey, 96 F. 713,713 (1899) (stating that it is assumed that employee assumes risk when
he "has notice of the general risks and dangers of his employment, such as that many of the cars
which he is required to handle as a switchman are defective, [therefore] the master is not guilty
of negligence in failing to notify him of each particular defect").
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the federal courts enforced
these employer defenses much more stringently
53
than did the state courts.
In addition to the liberal employer defenses permitted in federal court,
federal courts also adopted narrow and protective rules of liability. In Patton
'v. Texas & Pacific Railway Co., 54 the Court held that an injured employee
must prove that the defendant's negligence was a cause in fact of the injury.5
The decision denied injured employees the benefit of relying on the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur as a means of inferring the employer's negligence. 6
The expansion of the "general law" to torts was not limited to torts involving employee injuries. For example, federal courts adopted privity rules
that limited opportunities for injured consumers to recover for product defects
and increased the various means by which5 7common carriers could contract to
waive or limit their liability to customers.
53. PURCELL, supra note 36, at 75 (citing Lawrence M Friedman & Jack Landinsky,
Social Change and the Law oflndustrialAccidents,67 COLUM. L. REV. 50, 59-62 (1967)).
54.
179 U.S. 658 (1901).
55. Patton v. Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co., 179 U.S. 658,663 (1901).
56. Id. ("[lit is not sufficient for the employee to show that the employer may have been
guilty of negligence - the evidence must point to the fact that he was.").
57. PURCELL, supra note 36, at 82. In Gallbraith v. IllinoisSteel Co., the Seventh Circuit
held that an injured consumer could not seek relief against a steel company that erected a
structure for a sprinkler company with which the plaintiff contracted because there was no
privity of contract. Gallbraith v. l. Steel Co., 133 F. 485, 489 (7th Cir. 1904), cert denied,
201 U.S. 643 (1906). In requiring privity, the Seventh Circuit opinion indicated its intention
to protect business interests:
If the law should hold all the builders and makers and doers in the land t6 a[n] ...
absolute duty to use care that the thing shall be innocuous as it passes through the
hands of all mankind... we fancy few persons would be willing to do business, in
the face of the insufferable litigation that would ensue.
Id.
Although the general common law rule was that common carrers could not contract out
of liability incurred by "passengers for hire" caused by negligent employees, the federal courts
limited this doctrine in a way that proved very favorable to corporations. N.Y. Cont. R.R. Co.
v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 357, 384 (1873). In NorthernPacificRailway Co. v. Adams,
for example, the Supreme Court held that all passengers traveling on a free pass, containing
language limiting liability, are not "passengers for hire," and therefore will be held to have
waived any cause of action against the common carrier. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Adams, 192 U.S. 440
(1904).
The federal courts also limited the liability of the railroads by limiting their responsibility
for injuries occurring on their leased property. In Curtisv. Cleveland, Cincinnati,Chicago &
SL Louis Railway Co., 140 F. 777, 778 (C.C.E.D. Ill. 1905), and Yeates v. Illinois Central
Railway Co., 137 F. 943, 944-45 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1905), the courts addressed the liability rules
for railroad leases. In both cases, the state law held the lessor of a railroad track liable for the
negligence of the lessee. Curtis v. Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co., 140 F.
at 778; Yeates v. Ill. Cent. Ry. Co., 137 F. at 945. But, in Curtis,the federal court found that
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B. The Move Against Swift
By the 1890s, opposition to the Swift concept of a general common law
mounted." For instance, the federal courts became severely overcrowded
because cases were more frequently being removed by corporate defendants
to the federal courts in order that they could reap the benefits of the federal
common law of torts.59 Second, as the federal courts began to narrowly
construe or completely ignore relevant state laws, critics began to question the
correctness of Swift.' The language of the Judiciary Act was not so vague as
to justify ignoring state statutory and constitutional law. In addition, the
federal courts began to face criticism of their perceived pro-business interpretation of the federal general law.61 The criticism seemed to be not so much
about abstract federalism as a belief that the diversity system, intended to
protect out-of-state defendants against local plaintiffs, was tilting the playing
field the other way. This was especially true in cases involving the fellowservant rule and the Baugh decision because corporate non-resident defendants could avoid changes in state law that favored the injured employee by
removing the case to federal court.62
These critics ultimately prevailed in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.63 In
Erie,the Court examined a negligence action brought by a pedestrian who was
struck by a rail car. The Erie Railroad contended that the duty it owed to
Tompkins was that which it owed to a trespasser under Pennsylvania law,
while Tompkins argued that the railroad's duty should be determined by
federal courts as a matter of general law because there was no state statute on
the subject. Justice Brandeis's Erie opinion overturned Swift ostensibly
because it reinterpreted the concept of a "federal general common law"; in
performance of their common law functions, Erie recognized that state courts
do not look to a "general" law as recognized by Swift, but instead persist "in
their own opinions on questions of common law."' As a result, federal courts
"[t]he rule of law in question is not local, or the effect of a statute, or its constriction, but exists
as a general rule of the common law, which the federal courts determine for themselves." 140
F. at 779.
58. PURcELL, supra note 27, at 66.
59. PURCELL, supra note 36, at 50.
60. Id. at 225.
61. Id. at 73.
62. See id. at 264 (stating that federal court rules imposing heavy evidentiary burdens on
plaintiffs to show liability and strictly enforcing fellow-servant rule increasingly were perceived
as unfair during this time because "a number of state courts developed innovative ways to
ameliorate the harshness of their own common law rules and thereby widened the divergence
between federal and state law").
63.
304 U.S. 68 (1938).
64. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 68,74 (1938).

NEW FEDERAUISM JURISPRUDENCE AND TORT REFORM

487

following Swift had developed a body of common law that had no connection
to state common law. Therefore,
[p]ersistence of state courts in their own opinions on questions of common
law prevented uniformity, and the impossibility of discovering a satisfactory line of demarcation between the province of general law and that of
local law developed a new well of uncertainties.65
Furthermore, Swift created the opportunity for discrimination by non-citizens
against citizens depending on whether a plaintiff brought suit infederal or
state court and thus led to "injustice and confusion.""
The Erie opinion expressed the idea that a "federal general common law"
cannot exist and declared that the Swif doctrine was "an unconstitutional
assumption of powers" by federal courts.67 Justice Brandeis's reasoning relied
on the idea that no other law can exist in diversity cases except that ofthe states
because no other federal law can exist except in the areas in which Congress
is sovereign. "Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common
law applicable in a State whether they be local in their nature or 'general,' be
they commercial law or a part of the law oftorts."" The Judiciary Act of 1789
adopted this new interpretation. In a larger sense, however, the growing reform
movement which a conservative federal judiciary had long thwarted finally
prevailed.
C. CongressionalFederalization
Although Erie ended federal court usurpation of tort common law lawmaking, it did not silence the debate on whether the phrase "Congress has no
power" means precisely that. Exactly what is the extent of Congress's authority to legislate in the tort area? Scholars interpret Congress's power in tort to
derive principally from the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper
Clause, which give Congress substantial authority in the area.
Perhaps the best known example of the courts' long history of upholding
federal tort laws is the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA). 69 This Act
65.

Id.

66. Id. at 77.
67. Id. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab
& Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, I., dissenfing)).
68. Id. at 78. On the same day as the Erie decision, the Court reversed a decision that an
interstate compact concerning water rights was invalid because it concerned appropriate rights
guaranteed by Colorado's constitution. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch
Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938). Justice Brandeis, writing for the Court, said that "whether the water
of an interstate stream must be apportioned between the two States is a question of 'federal
common law' upon which neither the statutes nor the decisions of either State can be conclusive." Id. at 110 (citations omitted).
69. Employers' LiabilityAct,45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60(1994).
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was a "tort substitute" for workers' compensation in the railroad field and
defined the rights and obligations in personal injury and wrongful death
actions brought against railroads engaged in interstate commerce.7" When the

railroads challenged the legislation, the Supreme Court upheld the Act as a
constitutional exercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause.71
In Mondou v. New York, New Haven & Hartford RailroadCo.,72 the Court
held that "[a] person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of the
common law.... [T]he law itself, as a rule of conduct, may be changed at the

will ... of the legislature, unless prevented by constitutional limitations."7

The Court found that Congress had a legitimate interest in displacing tort law
for railroad workers.74
70. See id. (discussing liability for injuries to railroad employees).
71.
See Mondou v. N.Y., New Haven& Hartford R.R., 223 U.S. 1,48-52 (1912) (stating
that Congress acted within limits of its power under U.S. Constitution when it enacted FELA).
The Court had previously struck down a 1906 version of FELA in Howard v. Ill. Cent. RR.,
207 U.S. 463 (1908). In Howard, the Court found that the 1906 Act exceeded Congress's
Commerce Clause authority because it embraced "matters and things domestic in their character." Id. at 496-97.
72. 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
73.
Mondou v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R., 223 U.S. at 50 (citations omitted).
74. See id. at 51 (noting that Congress may determine that national law would better serve
needs of railroad commerce). Other examples exist of courts upholding legislation federalizing
tort law against constitutional challenge. In 1927, Congress enacted the Longshore and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), ch. 509, 44 Stat. 1424 (codified as amended at 33
U.S.C. §§ 901- 44 (1994)). Similar to FELA, the LHWCA awarded fixed amounts to employees or to their dependents in cases of employment-related personal injuries occurring upon the
navigable waters of the United States. See id. § 903(a) (covering employee's disability or death
occurring upon navigable waters of United States). Upon a challenge, the Supreme Court found
that Congress acted legitimately under its authority to revise or alter maritime law. See Crowell
v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 39-41 (1932) (upholding constitutionality of LHWCA). Of course,
Congress acted pursuant to its authority in admiralty, so arguably no foundation state law
existed for LHWCA to supplant.
Congress enacted the Drivers Act in 1961, which forbade individual tort suits against
federal drivers for accidents caused by a driver's negligence but allowed suits against the United
States: See Federal Drivers Act (Oovemment Drivers Act), Pub. L. No. 87-258, 75 Stat. 539
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)-(e) (1994)) (insulating federal employees from
personal liability for negligent acts arising from use of motor vehicle in course of employment).
A district court upheld the Act as a valid exercise of legislative power under the Necessary and
Proper Clause of Article . See Nistendirk v. McGee, 225 F. Supp. 881, 882 (W.D. Mo. 1963)
(determining that Federal Drivers Act is valid exercise of legislative power). The other question
that arose after the enactment of the Drivers Act was whether the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA) limited the claims of federal employees who were injured by federal drivers
to those against the United States or whether the employees could also bring a common law tort
action against the negligent co-worker. See Federal Employees' Compensation Act, §§ 81018193 (1994) (providing compensation for work injuries of federal employees). Courts that
addressed the issue uniformly held that the Drivers Act abrogated the common law rule. See
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Since Erie and the New Deal, the federal system has changed substan-

tially to overlap with or to displace the authority of the states as the dominant
force regulating the private lives of most Americans. Erie intended to bind

the federal courts to state law, but as centralization increased, the reach of the
Erie doctrine became more limited. Now, a specialized federal common law
derived from federal statutes and regulations is evolving. The difference,
though, is that under Swift, state courts were basically free to develop their
own jurisprudence as it applied to their residents. The new federal common
law, however, binds the state tribunals because it extrapolates from federal
statutory law and therefore is supreme.
More recent decisions have shown increasing reluctance to allow Congress to expand its powers on matters of local concern, of which tort law may
be a significant part. This Article now provides an overview of these recent
federalism decisions but does not attempt to support or oppose the validity of
the current Court's theory of federalism - a task that many others have undertaken." Rather, this Article seeks to identify the components of prevailing
Noga v. United States, 411 F.2d 943, 944 (9th Cir. 1969) (finding that Federal Drivers Act and
FECA limit plaintiff to remedy against U.S. and abrogate common law tort remedy against
negligent fellow employee); Van Houten v. Rails, 411 F.2d 940, 943 (9th Cir. 1969) (noting
that "federal legislative objective in enacting the Federal Drivers Act while leaving the exclusivity provision of the FECA intact was apparently to protect federal drivers from personal liability
by rendering the Government ...liable only under the FECA in the case of federal employee
plaintiffs"); Vantrease v. United States, 400 F.2d 853, 856 (6th Cir. 1968) (noting that injured
federal employee was not entitled to common law action against alleged tortfeasor; rather, his
sole remedy was under FECA); Beechwood v. United States, 264 F. Supp. 926, 926-27 (D.
Mont. 1967) (dismissing case because federal employee plaintiff had no cause of action against
federal employee defendant in defendant's personal capacity, rather, plaintiff is limited to
recovery under FECA).
The next wave of litigation challenged Congress's authority to revoke common law rule
by statute. The courts, in turn, rejected the argument that Congress exceeded its powers in
passing the Drivers Act and in abrogating the traditional common law rule. See Thomason v.
Sanchez, 539 F.2d 955, 959-60 (3d Cir. 1976) (stating that even though serviceman injured by
another serviceman had no cause of action under "Feres doctrine," Drivers Act did not constitute denial of due process under Fifth Amendment); Carr v. United States, 422 F.2d 1007, 101012 (4th Cir. 1970) (finding no violation of Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses of Fifth
Amendment, even though Drivers Act did not create new benefit or distinguish between federal
employees injured in vehicular accidents and federal workers injured in other job-related
activities). Several other federal tort law statutes have survived constitutional challenges. See
generally Victor E. Schwartz et al., Federalism and Federal Liability Reform: The United
States ConstitutionSupportsReform, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 269, 288-300 (1999) (discussing
Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, The Price Anderson Act, Swine Flu Act, Atomic Weapons
Testing Liability Act, National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Price-Anderson Act
Amendments of 1988, Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act, and
General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994).
75. See, e.g., Ann Althouse, Lecture, On Dignity andDeference: The Supreme Court's
New Federalism, 68 U. CIN. L. REv. 245, 245-50 (2000) (explaining federalism of Burger and
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principles of federalism and to predict how the Supreme Court might apply
those elements to federal tort reform legislation.

III. The New FederalismDecisions
Despite the sovereignty of the states under the federal system, the federal
power under the Constitution is vast.76 Not only does the Constitution confer
on Congress broad enumerated powers, particularly under the Commerce
Clause, it enables Congress to enact "any laws.. . necessary and proper" to
effectuate its power."
Rehnquist Courts as balancing of state and federal interests); Edward Hartnett, Why Is The
Supreme Court of the United States ProtectingState Judgesfrom PopularDemocracy?, 75
TEX. L. REV. 907,985-86 (1997) (explaining federalism's application to standing to seek review
of state court's judgment in U.S. Supreme Court); Vicki C. Jackson, Federalismand the Uses
andLimits ofLaw: Printz and Principle?,111 HARV. L. REV. 2180,2228-29 (1998) (discussing judicial enforcement of federalism-based constraints on federal government).
76. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (enumerating congressional powers); id. amend. X ("The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.").
77. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, 18. This Article focuses on the commerce power, on
which Congress usually relies when displacing state tort actions. The national government
possesses many other important powers, of course, such as the war power, U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 11,and the treaty power, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
Congress may exercise its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment by
enacting legislation that provides tort remedies to protect the constitutional rights of private
citizens. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. For example, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) provides a
remedy for interference with one's civil rights under color of state law. See Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961) (justifying § 1983 under Fourteenth Amendment), overruled by
Monnell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Because no analogous statute provides
a remedy for interference with one's civil rights under color of federal law, the Supreme Court
created such a remedy in Bivens v. Six Unknown NamedAgents ofFederalBureauof Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971).
Despite this power, Congress has resisted attempts to make the Fourteenth Amendment
"a font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may already be administered by
the States." Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976) (finding no Fourteenth Amendment
deprivation when police distributed flyers describing plaintiff as "active shoplifter"). See Coll.
Say. Bank v. Fl. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,674 (1999) (stating
that expanding Fourteenth Amendment property interests to encompass right to be free from
unfair competition "would violate our frequent admonition that the Due Process Clause is not
merely a 'font of tort law'" (quoting Paul,424 U.S. at 701)); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,
335-36 (1986) (holding that defendant had no due process claim when state employee's
negligence caused his fall even though defendant could claim immunity under state law); Parratt
v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543-44 (1981) (finding that states' own tort remedy provided sufficient
due process to prisoner whose property was lost due to state's negligence), overruled by Daniels
v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
The Court has also interpreted the Constitution as placing limits on state tort actions.
These limits may create space for federal legislation. For example, the Court has limited
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A badly splintered Court is leading a revolution of sorts regarding these
federal powers. A major issue in the federalism debate is whether pockets of
exclusive state power exist upon which the federal government cannot encroach that stem from a constitutional vision that sees a division of power
between federal and state governments as better protection for individual
rights. The Court's decisions that touched on federalism in the last several

terms do not resolve the issue but indicate a stronger solicitude for state
sovereignty. Both the Court's focus on a Congress of limited powers and its
continued protection of the states from federal lawsuits and from federal
policy "commandeering" reflect this solicitude. Although national legislation
federalizing tort law most likely will derive its power from the Commerce
Clause, recent decisions re-examining the federalism doctrine under the Tenth
and Eleventh Amendments would also determine whether federal tort reform
would pass constitutional muster."8 This Article examines these decisions
briefly below.
remedies under state-created defamation actions on First Amendment grounds. See, e.g.,
Milkovich v . Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 3, 21 (1990) (finding that statements of "opinion"
are neither privileged under First Amendment nor exempt from state libel laws); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-48 (1974) (finding that First Amendment does not require that
states impose standard articulated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan when plaintiff is neither
public official nor public figure); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964)
(holding that, under First Amendment, state cannot award libel damages in actions by public
official unless official proves actual malice - that speaker knew statement was false or spoke
with reckless disregard of whether it was true or false). The Court has also used due process
to limit punitive damages awarded under state tort law. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517
U.S. 559, 585-86 (1996) (concluding that two million dollar punitive damages award was
grossly excessive and so violated Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment); Honda Motor
Co., v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 434-45 (1994) (remarking that jury's decision to award punitive
damages is exercise of state power that must comply with Due Process Cliuse); TXO Prod.
Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 460-61, 466 (1993) (finding ten million dollar
punitive damages award was reasonably related to potential harm from defendant's conduct, and
so was not grossly excessive and did not violate Due Process Clause). The Court stated in City
ofBoerne v. Flores that Congress must receive much deference in its determinations of "what
legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment." City of Boeme
v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651
(1966)). Thus, "[l]gislation which deters or remedies constitutional violations can fall within
the sweep of Congress' enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is
not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into 'legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved
to the States.'" Id. at 518 (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445,455 (1976)).
78. One author argues, for example, that national tort reform would face a constitutional
challenge as possibly "commandeering" the state judges and state courts to promulgate and
enforce federal tort reform. See Cynthia C. Lebow, FederalismandFederalProductLiability
Reform: Warning Not Heeded, 64 TVNN. L. REV. 665, 680 (1997) (arguing that "compelling
state courts to litigate under a complex set of rules dictated by Congress will prove as antithetical to prevailing theories of state sovereignty as compelling state legislatures to legislate").
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A. EnumeratedPowers
In the last decade, the Supreme Court actively has developed federalism
doctrine under the enumerated powers. In particular, the Court has focused on
congressional power under the Commerce Clause. From the beginning, courts
generally have construed this power broadly. In Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Chief
Justice John Marshall defined the commerce power as "comprehend[ing] every
species of commercial intercourse," comprising both interstate and foreign
commerce."0 As the Chief Justice stated, "[tihis power, like all others vested
in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and
acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the Constitution."8
Although courts have examined this initial broad construction with different
tests throughout history, they generally have maintained a broad construction
until recently.
Between 1890 and 1937, the Supreme Court used various formal categories to strike down progressive legislation and New Deal legislation that
Congress passed under the Commerce Clause. It drew distinctions between
"commerce" and "police" powers, 2 between "direct" and "indirect" effects on
84
commerce, 3 and between "flow " and "rest" in the "stream of commerce.1
The Court justified its reliance on these categories as an effort to avoid
undermining the police power of the states." In 1937, the Court famously
reversed direction and adopted a "substantial effect" test that expanded congressional power under the Commerce Clause 6 so far that many believed that
79. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
80. Oibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 193 (1824).
81. Id. at 196.
82. See Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 361 (1903) (noting that Congress had given
states power to regulate in-state commerce of alcohol under states' own police powers).
83. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546 (1935)
(noting well-established distinction between direct and indirect effects on interstate commerce).
84. See id.
at 543 (distinguishing instances when goods come to rest permanently in state
and those when goods are destined for later transportation to other states).
85. See id.at 546 (stating that "[i]f the commerce clause were construed to reach all
enterprises and transactions which could be said to have an indirect effect upon interstate
commerce, the federal authority would embrace practically all the activities of the people and
the authority of the State over its domestic concerns would exist only by sufferance of the
federal government").
86. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (stating that Congress has power to exercise control over activities that "have such a close and substantial relation
to interstate commerce that [Congress's] control is essential or appropriate to protect that
commerce from burdens and obstructions"); see also Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241,257 (1964) (noting existence of overwhelming evidence of disruptive effect
of racial discrimination on commercial intercourse); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294,304
(1964) (finding that racial discrimination in local restaurants directly and adversely affected
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the power was without judicial limitation.'
In1995, however, the Supreme Court struck down a congressional enactment under the Commerce Clause for the first time since the New Deal."' In
UnitedStates v. Lopez, 9 the Court held that Congress did not have the power
to prohibit the possession of guns near schools." The Court laid out three
categories of activity within the scope of the commerce power, the broadest
category addressing activities that '"substantially affect" - not just "affect" interstate commerce.91 These categories do not focus on state authority to act;
interstate commerce); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111,125 (1942) (stating that Congress may
regulate activity that "exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce").
87. See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,307-08 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment) (remarking that "one could easily get the sense from this
Court's opinions that the federal system exists only at the sufferance of Congress"); H. Jefferson
Powell, The Oldest Question of ConstitutionalLaw, 79 VA. L. REV. 633, 633 (1993) (opining
that for most of last half-century, no constitutional law of federalism had existed in United
States).
I
88. The Supreme Court held that Congress's power under the Commerce Clause was
limited when Congress sought to regulate the states directly, by affecting traditional state
functions. Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976), overruled by Garcia v.
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). A divided Court in Nat I League of
Cities invalidated the amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act that extended the statute's
minimum wage and maximum hours provisions to most state employees, holding that regulation
of traditional governmental functions involving matters "essential to [the] separate and independent existence" of the states was beyond Congress's power under the Commerce Clause and
the Tenth Amendment. See id. at 845 (quoting Coyle v. Oklahoma, 551 U.S. 559, 580 (1911)).
The Court distinguished federal regulation of private activity from regulation "directed ... to
the States as States." Id.
The Court overruled Usery in Garciav. San Antonio Metropolitan TransitAuthority,469
U.S. 528, 557 (1985). In Garcia,the Court recognized that the political process should protect
states from direct congressional regulation, not the courts, and rejected a traditional state function test. Id. at 546-47, 556. Although the Usery rationale had become too difficult to apply,
the Court recognized
that the States occupy a special and specific position in our constitutional system
and that the scope of Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause must reflect
that position. But the principal and basic limit on the federal commerce power is
that inherent in all congressional action - the built-in restraints that our system
provides through state participation in federal government action.
Id. at 556.
89. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
90. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,567-68 (1995).
91. Id.at558-59.
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce. Second,
Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may
come only from intrastate activities. Finally, Congress' commerce authority in-
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they focus instead on whether the activity Congress regulates constitutes
"commerce."

The test received criticism for its lack of guidance or bounds
because it does not analyze when Congress may regulate pursuant to its
commerce power.93
In 2000, the Court indicated that Lopez was not an aberration and that
Congress simply cannot regulate some activities under its commerce power.94
In United States v. Morrison,95 the Court struck down the civil remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act. 96 The majority, in a five-to-four
eludes the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate
commerce, i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.
Id. (citations omitted).

Even Justice Breyer in dissent proposed "significant" rather than "substantial," thereby
also rejecting mere "effects." Id. at 616 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
92. The Court held that intrastate activities can be regulated if the underlying activity is
commercial or economic. Id. at 559-61.
93. See Jesse H. ChoperDidLastTerm Reveal "ARevolutionaryStates'RightsMovement
Within the Supreme Court?," 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 663, 668 (1996) (stating that Justice
Thomas's concurrence attempts to put "real limits on congressional power" but his approach

"plainly does not represent the views of a majority of the Supreme Court"). Even though Lopez
holds that congressional power to regulate private activity has limits, several commentators
predicted that the decision did not appear likely "to curtail [federal power] in any significant
way." Larry Kramer, UnderstandingFederalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1487 n.4 (1994).
Although City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) is a separation-of-powers case,
it is noteworthy here because of the federalism concerns raised by the case. Under examination
was the constitutionality of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb (1994). That statute favored restoration of the compelling state interest test recently
rejected by the Supreme Court. RFRA was held unconstitutional in its "attempt [to make] a
substantive change in constitutional protections." Id. at 532. According to the Court, the statute
swept too broadly and "ensures its intrusion at every level of [local] government, displacing
laws and prohibiting official actions of almost every description and regardless of subject
matter." Id. Federalism concerns account in large part for the result of the case. The subsequent decisions in FloridaPrepaidPossecondaryEducation
ExpenseBoardv.College Savings
Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999), and College Savings Bank v. Florida PrepaidPostsecondary
Education Expense Board, 527 U.S. 666 (1999), rely heavily on the City of Boerne decision.
94. In Jones v. United States,the Court stressed its solicitude for state sovereignty in the

criminal law context. The Court unanimously held that Congress did not intend a federal arson
law, which requires that a building be "used" in an activity affecting commerce, to apply to the

arson of a private residence, in order to avoid any constitutional issues. See Jones v. United
States, 529 U.S. 848, 849 (2000) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (2000), which makes arson
against property used in interstate commerce federal crime). As the Court stated: "To read
§ 844(i) as encompassing the arson of an owner-occupied private home would effect such a
change [on the federal-state balance], for arson is a paradigmatic common-law state crime." Id.
at858.
95.
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
96. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000); see Violence Against Women
Act of 1994, § 40302, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000) (granting civil remedies to women who are
victims of crime).

NEWFEDERALISM JURISPRUDENCEAND TORT REFORM

495

decision, rejected both ofthe sources of constitutional authority that Congress

asserted as the basis for the legislation and concluded that the civil remedy
provision was neither a valid regulation of interstate commerce nor a proper
means of enforcing the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment.9
In Morrison, the Court made clear that it is not enough for Congress
simply to recite that the activity it seeks to regulate has some impact on
interstate commerce or even to amass evidence of such effects. The Court
stated that Lopez demonstrated that "in those cases where we have sustained

federal regulation of intrastate activity based upon the activity's substantial
effects on interstate commerce, the activity in question has been some sort of
economic endeavor."' In contrast, gender-motivated violent crimes, accord-

ing to the Court, "are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity.""
In addition to examining whether the statute regulates economic activity,
the Court also was concerned about whether the activity being regulated was

one traditionally overseen by the states."° The Court held that an indirect
impact on the national economy does not suffice to invoke congressional
power;"°1 it worried that use of a "but-for" causal analysis would allow Congress to invoke Commerce Clause power to regulate murder, family law, and
other areas of traditional state concern."
Chief Justice Rehnquist reinforced the notion of separate areas of state
regulation. "The Constitution," he emphasized, "requires a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local."'0 3 He continued:
In recognizing this fact we preserve one of the few principles that has been
consistent since the [Commerce] Clause was adopted. The regulation and
97. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619,627.
98. Id. at 611.
99. Id. at 613.
100. A similar concern has been raised by the Court in other contexts. In determining
whether a private right of action may be implied from a federal statute, the Court considers,
among other factors, whether "the subject matter involves an area basically of concern to the
States." Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677,708 (1979).
101.
See Morrison,529 U.S. at 608 (noting that "scope of the interstate commerce power
must be considered in light of our dual system of government and may not be extended so as
to... obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local" (citations omitted)).
102. See id. at 615-16 (stating that "ifCongress may regulate gender-motivated violence,
it would be able to regulate murder or any other type of violence... as well [as] family law and
other areas of traditional state regulation"). The Court noted that Congress expressly precluded
the Act from being used in the family law context, presumably trying to avoid this effect Id.
at 616.
103. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-18 (2000) (citing United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 568 (1995)).
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punishment of intrastate violence that is not directed at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in interstate commerce has always been

the province of the States. Indeed, we can think of no better example of
the police power, which the Founders denied the National Government and
reposed in the States, than the suppression ofviolent crime and vindication
of its victims. '

Some have argued that the commercial/noncommercial distinction, along
with the rest of the decisions in the Court's "federalist revival,"'0' resurrects
the notion of"dual federalism.h"' o The idea of distinct spheres that give either
104. Id. at 618 (citations omitted).
105. The term was coined by Professor Jackson. See Jackson,supra note 75, at 2213 ("The
Court's new activism compounds assertions that federalism is dead and... requires continued
attention to the foundations for federalism's revival.").
106.

See, e.g., Mathew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism:

New York, Printz and Yeskey, 1998 S. CT. REv. 71, 72 ("The doctrines... create a regime of
dichotomous boundaries. Like the federalism jurisprudence set forth, a generation ago, in
NationalLeague ofCitiesv. Usery, the new jurisprudence of commandeering purports to define
an area of total state (and local) immunity from federal intervention."); Andrew I. Gavil,
Introduction: Seminole Tribe and the Creeping Reemergence of DualFederalism, 23 OHIo

N.U. L. REV. 1393, 1400 (1997) ("[O]n a broader plane, the combined impact of the current
Court's federalism jurisprudence, as in cases like Lopez, New York v. United States and
especially Seminole Tribe, leads one to believe that we are moving back towards the 'dual
federalism' model believed to have expired by the time of the New Deal."); Jackson, supra note
75, at 2257-58 (stating that Printz's rule forbidding federal directives to state employees is not
adequately supported by historical or functional considerations; advocating milder federalism
based on limits on national legislation); H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., The Quixotic Searchfor a
Judicially Enforceable Federalism,83 MINN. L. REV. 849, 868 (1999) ("Just one year after

clearing its throat in Ashcrofl, the Court in New York v. United States firmly announced its
return to the business of protecting states from national encroachment- In establishing its new
role, both in New York and then again in Printz, the Court professed to distinguish Garcia but
in fact cut the legs out from under that case's political process approach while embracing the
'dual federalism' or state-sovereignty model it had abandoned twice before."). See also Martin

H. Redish, DoingIt with Mirrors: New York v. United States and ConstitutionalLimitations
on FederalPower to Require State Legislation, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 593, 595 (1994)

("[B]y its terms, the Constitution effectively prohibits the total consumption of state authority
by the assertion of federal power. Modem Supreme Court doctrine, however, has all but
achieved that end, in practical terms if not in name. Rather than invent otherwise non-existent
constitutional protections of state governments, the Court would be better advised to devote
serious attention to redefining the modem constitutional limits on the reach of federal power.");

Peter M. Shane, Federalism's"OldDeal". What's Right and Wrong with ConservativeJudicial

Activism, 45 VILL. L. REV. 201, 215 (2000) ("I would call this the 'dual federalism interpretation' of Lopez, because it would attribute to the case not so much a sensitivity to contextual
facts as a categorical intention to evict federal legislators from some exclusive domain of state
policy making.").
In Morrison,Justice Souter accused the majority of following the same sort of "formalistically contrived confines of commerce power" that "provoked the judicial crisis of 1937."
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,642 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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the states or federal government exclusive regulatory authority, known as
"dual federalism," died around 1937 and finally was put to rest in a famous
article by Edward Corwin in 1950." Other commentators have distinguished
between the Court's current approach to federalism and the fixed enclaves of
dual federalism."° Although the model I propose does not need to reach the
question, I do not interpret Morrison as attempting to identify particular subject areas of state regulatory authority and placing them off-limits to federal
encroachment. Rather, Morrison seems to reinforce the notion of concurrent
power, although some areas of state jurisdiction, like family law, require
greater solicitude against federal encroachment than others."°
In addition to distinguishing between federal and state areas of sovereignty, Morrison does not defer to congressional judgment. Although the
law's sponsors had compiled a volume of evidence to show why a national
approach to violence against women was needed, Chief Justice Rehnquist
emphasized: "We ...reject the argument that Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely in that conduct's aggregate
effect on interstate commerce."'"' Morrison reached its result despite the
support of thirty-eight states urging the law's passage.' 1"
Thus, Morrison rejects the philosophy underlying Garciav. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,"' which favored a political-process
approach to federalism that presumes Congress is capable of adjusting power
between the federal and state governments. Instead, a deep-seated respect
for states as sovereigns motivated-the Court's decision. Congressional action
107. See Edward S. Corwin, The Passingof DualFederalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1, 2-24
(1950) (tracing demise of early dual federal jurisprudence).
108. See Larry Kramer, UnderstandingFederalism,47 VAND. L. REV.1485, 1499 (1994)
(stating that "[clourts have moved from prophylactic categories to case-by-case standards in a
variety of areas, and in theory at least, nothing prevents them from doing so in the area of
federalism"); Ernest A. Young, Dual Federalism, ConcurrentJurisdiction,and the Foreign
Affairs Exception, 69 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 139, 140 (2001) (stating that recent federalism cases
do not attempt to identify particular subject matter areas of state regulatory authority, making
them off limits to federal action).
109. For example, although the Court's language strongly suggests singling out criminal
law as a sphere reserved for state regulation, the Court made clear in a decision a week later that
some forms of arson - "a paradigmatic common-law state crime" - fall Within the reach of the
Commerce power. Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 858 (2000) (construing federal arson
statute as limited to buildings used for commercial purposes); see also Troxel v. Granville, 530
U.S. 57, 73 (2000) (protecting parental rights against Washington state grandparent statutes but
hesitating to rule broadly on constitutional standard); Young, supranote 108, at 158-59.
110. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,617-18 (2000).
111.
See id. at 653 (stating that thirty-eight states' attorney generals called for Congress
to pass Violence Against Women Act (Souter, J.,
dissenting)).
note
88
(discussing Garcia).
112. 469 U.$528 (1985); see supra
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must not blur3 "the distinction between what is truly national and what is
truly local."1
The Court's recent decisions under the Tenth and Eleventh Amend-

ments reflect this desire to respect sovereign interests. In its recent Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has made clear that state immunity
from private suits is critical to the dignity of states as sovereigns." 4 In
Alden v. Maine,"5 the Court addressed the question whether Congress could

compel states to defend federal claims in state courts and a five-to-four
majority upheld the dismissal of such an action on the grounds of sovereign
immunity." 6 To avoid a suggestion that states may disregard federal law,
Justice Kennedy, in his majority decision, mentioned the need for suprem-

acy, but relied on the states' good faith rather than private suit compulsion,
consent, or the possibility that the federal government may bring nonconsensual suits against them." 7 Throughout Alden, Justice Kennedy expressed
113. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-18; see Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs,
531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001) (concluding that Corps' rule extending definition of "navigable
waters" under Clean Water Act to include intrastate waters exceeded authority granted Corps
under Act and warning against federal encroachment of traditional state power).
114. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1998) ("[Flederal jurisdiction
over suits against unconsenting States 'was not contemplated by the Constitution.. ."' (citation
omitted)). In 1996, Seminole Tribe examined the question whether Congress, through its
Article I powers, could subject the states to private federal suits. In rejecting that claim, the
majority opinion reasoned that Congress may only abrogate state sovereign immunity when
enforcing provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, which "expand[s] federal power at the
expense of state autonomy .... " Id. at 59.
115.
527 U.S. 706 (1999).
116. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 758-60 (1999) ("To the extent Maine has chosen
to consent to certain classes of suits while maintaining its immunity from others, it has done no
more than exercise a privilege of sovereignty .... "). The standard the Court developed for
determining whether Article I legislation subjects states to private suits in their own courts is
whether "there is 'compelling evidence' that the states were required to surrender this power to
Congress pursuant to the constitutional design." Id. at 731 (citations omitted).
117. See id. at 757 (stating that "federal power to subject nonconsenting States to private
suits in their own courts is unnecessary to uphold the Constitution and valid federal statutes as
the supreme law"). An individual may sue a state for money damages only if (1) Congress
explicitly authorizes such a suit in exercising its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment;
or (2) the state waives its sovereign immunity. See Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,670 (1999) (stating circumstances in which citizen
may sue State). In College Savings Bank and Florida PrepaidPostsecondaryEducation
Expense Boardv. College SavingsBank, two cases decided during the same term as Alden, the
Court grappled with alleged state invasion of private property cases, the former case involving
trademarks and the latter case involving patents. Id.; Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 630 (1999). These cases reflect the same five-to-four
split on the issues of the scope of the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity and Congress's
ability to subject states to federal law.
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concern about the potential affront to the "dignity" of the states if individuals
are permitted to sue them:
The federal system established by our Constitutionpreserves the sovereign
status of the States in two ways. First, it reserves to them a substantial
portion of the Nation's primary sovereignty, together with the dignity and
essential attributes inhering in that status .... Second, even as to matters
within the competence of the National Government, the constitutional
design secures the founding generation's rejection of the "concept of a
central government that would act upon and through the States" in favor of
"a system in which the State and Federal Governments would exercise
concurrent authority over the people - who were, in Hamilton's words, 'the
only objects of government"'11
As Justice Kennedy wrote, "[States] are not relegated to the role of mere
provinces or political corporations, but retain the dignity, though not full
119

authority, of sovereignty."

Similarly, when it considered whether states can be sued by their employees under the federal law against age discrimination, the Court held, in another
five-to-four ruling, that Congress exceeded its Fourteenth Amendment remedial powers when it abrogated the states' immunity from suits brought under

the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). 20 Even though Con-

gress was unequivocally clear in expressing its intent to abolish the states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit, that abrogation was both disproportionate to any unconstitutional conduct the states could conceivably commit
and unsupported by adequate congressional findings of age discrimination by
the states that it exceeded Congress's authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact "appropriate legislation" to enforce the Equal
Protection Clause.'21
Most recently, the Court held, in yet another five-to-four decision, that
Congress again exceeded its Fourteenth Amendment powers to abrogate state
sovereign immunity when it enacted Title I of the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 (ADA). 22 The Court found that Congress failed to establish an
118. Alden, 527 U.S. at 714 (citations omitted).
119. Id.at 715.
120. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000) (stating that ADEA's
purported abrogation of States' sovereign immunity was invalid under Fourteenth Amendment).
121. See id. (finding that because ADEA was not valid exercise of congressional power
under Fourteenth Amendment, ADEA's attempt to abrogate state's sovereignty was invalid);
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 5 (giving Congress "power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,"
the provisions of Fourteenth Amendment).
122. Title I, Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117. See Bd.
of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (stating that "in order [for Congress] to authorize private individuals to recover money damages against the States, there must
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appropriate exercise of its authority in the language of the ADA. Moreover,

the majority found the record compiled by Congress troublesome: it determined that the ADA's legislative record was insufficient to show a history and

pattern of irrational employment discrimination by the states against the
disabled." Even if Congress had established a sufficient record, proportionality concerned the Court. The Court found that the rights and remedies

the states were not "congruent and proportional
created by the ADA against
24
to the targeted violation.'0

These recent decisions thus indicate the Court's belief that sovereign
immunity is critical to protecting the states' dignity as sovereigns. 25 The real
concern, according to Professor Ann Althouse, is states' survival, which cannot

depend on the will of Congress. 26 "The real, practical concern.. . is to protect
the states as independently functioning government institutions by sparing

them the impact of accumulated liability for their past violations of law."' 27
The Court's recent decisions under the Tenth Amendment that invoke the
anti-commandeering principle reflect this same interest in protecting state
sovereignty. Historically, Congress has used its spending power to regulate

indirectly several areas traditionally of state concern." 2 Indirect regulation of

the states has limitations when congressional pressure turns into unconstitutional compulsion for the states to regulate. 29 In New York v. UnitedStates, 3 °

for example, the Court held that Congress had unconstitutionally commanbe a pattern of discrimination by the States which violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and the
remedy imposed by Congress must be congruent and proportional to the targeted violation," and
that Congress had not met burden when applying ADA to States).
123. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368 (stating that "the legislative record of the ADA ...
simply fails to show that Congress did in fact identify a pattern of irrational state discrimination
in employment against the disabled").
124. Id. at 374. The dissent argued that Congress had compiled sufficient evidence of
discriminatory treatment by local governments and that the Constitution requires only that
"Congress reasonably could have concluded that the remedy" was "appropriate." Id. at 377
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
125. See Althouse, supranote 75, at 250-51 (criticizing Court's recent protection of state's
"dignity," and arguing for normative federalism model); Georgene Vairo, JudicialCongress v.
CongressionalFederalism: The Implicationsof the New FederalismDecisionson Mass Tort
Cases and Other Complex Litigation, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1559, 1612 (2000) (arguing that
Interstate Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1999 may violate Tenth and Eleventh Amendments
under new federalism decisions).
126. See Althouse, supra note 75, at 266.
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 212 (1987) (upholding legislation
under which federal highway funds would be withheld from any state that failed to enact
legislation prohibiting purchase or possession of alcohol by persons under twenty-one years).
129. Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism,82 MINN. L. REv. 317,363 (1997).
130. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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deered the state legislative process by requiring a state legislature to enact a law
providing for the disposal of radioactive waste generated within the state's
borders. ' Similarly, in Printz v. United States,3 2 the Court struck down the
part of the Brady Handgun Violence Protection Act' that required state
officers to assist in the implementation of federal regulation by performing
criminal background checks on firearms purchasers.' 34 The Court identified
two ways by which Congress "may urge a State to adopt a legislative program
consistent with federal interests. "I'First, Congress can use its spending power
to attach certain conditions on the receipt of federal funds as a wayto influence
state policy. 36 Second, Congress can establish a "program of cooperative
federalism," thereby allowing states to choose to follow federal standards or to
have state law preempted by federal regulation. 13 Anything beyond those
parameters, however, would unconstitutionally "commandeer" the states. " In
both New York and Printz, the Court viewed the preservation of political
accountability as a major reason for prohibiting commandeering. It found that
state governments could remain responsive to the local electorate's policy
preferences through indirect regulation; however, if Congress were able to
compel states to regulate, political accountability would diminish. 39
131.
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 114, 174-75 (1992) (stating that Congress had
commandeered state legislative process by compelling states to enact and enforce nuclear waste
regulatory program).
132. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
133.
18 U.S.C. §§ 921-930 (2000).
134. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding part of Brady Act
unconstitutional).
135. New York; 505 U.S. at 166.
136. See id.at 167 (stating that Congress may encourage States to regulate by attaching
conditions to receipt of federal funds).
137. See id. (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mning & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,
289 (1981)).
138. Cf.F.E.R.C. v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 771 (1982), in which the Court upheld
provisions of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 that imposed certain procedural
requirements on state commissions regulating energy. The Court emphasized that the area of
public utility regulation was one in which Congress could preempt the states completely and
that the states could avoid the federal obligation by deciding not to regulate. Id. at 764-65.
139. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 930 (1997) (stating that Congress could
avoid political accountability by forcing states to undertake federal program); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992) (stating that "where the Federal Government compels
States to regulate, the accountability of both State and Federal officials is diminished"). In its
latest pronouncement, however, the Supreme Court refrained from expanding the scope of its
"anti-commandeering" principle, suggesting that the Court is not simply guarding "states rights."
In Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000), the Court reviewed the constitutionality of a federal
law that barred states from selling personal data on drivers' licenses. Id. A unanimous Court
held that the Driver's Privacy Protection Act (DPPA) did not violate the Tenth Amendment,
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Given the Court's new aggressive protection of state sovereignty and
dignity, it is likely that federal tort reform legislation will invite constitutional
challenges. Lopez and Morrison require that the activity Congress seeks to
regulate must constitute "commerce." As discussed later in this Article, aside
from products liability, which has its basis in interstate commerce, and perhaps motor vehicle accidents, which involve interstate movement and industry, torts generally do not involve an economic exchange. The externalities
associated with torts - e.g., insurance - may involve commercial transactions
with interstate repercussions 40 but the torts themselves do not. Instead, torts
typically involve individual conduct that is local in nature. For example, in
Morrison, the Court struck down the civil remedy provision of the Violence
Against Women Act precisely because it did not advance an economic interest. " ' Some tort cases may simply be too attenuated from interstate commerce to rely on the Commerce Clause as a basis for regulation.
Regardless of whether legislation federalizing tort law would be declared
invalid as exceeding congressional authority, as a practical matter, the exerinstead concluding that it permissibly "'regulate[s] state activities,' rather than 'seek[ing] to
control or influence the manner in which States regulate private parties.'" Id. at 150 (quoting
South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 514-15 (1988)). Contrasting the earlier anti-commandeering cases, the Court found that the DPPA was a straightforward federal regulation of state
activity, which neither requires the states to pass legislation nor commands state executive
officers to enforce a federal program. Id. at 151. As to congressional authority, the Court held
that the law fit comfortably within the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce
because the information was an "article of commerce" in the context of the statute and "its sale
or release into the interstate stream of business is sufficient to support Congressional regulation." Id. at 148.
Further, the Court stated "that a State wishing to engage in certain activity must take
administrative and sometimes legislative action to comply with federal standards regulating that
activity is a commonplace that presents no constitutional defect." See id. at 150-51 (quoting
Baker, 485 U.S. at 514-15).
In contrast to the Prntz'and New York opinions, the Condon case does not address the
issue of political accountability. Nor did it reach the ruling by the lower court that the federal
government could regulate the states only by means of "generally applicable" laws, ones that
do not single out states for regulation.
140. Insurance may provide the link to interstate commerce to allow Congress plenary
power to federalize tort law under the Commerce Clause. See Ackerman, supra note 6, at 441
(stating that "[i]nsurance links the overwhelming majority of tort claims, whatever their origin,
to interstate commerce"). Congress could include an interstate jurisdictional element in its
statute, say, a civil action in federal court against persons who cross state lines to commit a tort.
Other commentators have interpreted the anti-commandeering Eleventh Amendment
holdings to suggest that Congress may lack the power to direct state judges to enforce federal
tort reform legislation. See Lebow, supranote 78, at 690 (concluding that "[ l]egislators should
not attempt to conscript the state courts as agents of reform in contravention of fundamental
notions of federalism").
141.
See supra notes 95-113 and accompanying text (discussingMorrison holding).
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cise of congressional power to regulate and preempt also remains a threat to
the states. The assumption behind the exercise of the preemption power, of
course, is that Congress has the power to regulate. However, the Court's
recent preemption cases that generally displace state laws seem inconsistent
with its recent Commerce Clause and Eleventh Amendment decisions that
generally protect state laws and powers. This Article examines those cases
next.
B. The Power to Preempt
The goal of safety is sought through two different approaches: tort
liability and die regulation at the state and federal level. Tort liability
applies ex post to hold tortfeasors liable for accident costs. Decisions about
product safety, for example, are made on a case-by-case basis. On the other
hand, federal agencies heavily regulate products by creating mandatory
requirements that manufacturers must meet in order to sell their products on
the market. This type of ex ante regulation is specific and uniformly applies
across the country. Such heavy regulation of products has led to extensive
litigation under the preemption power. Examination of these cases sheds light
on the Court's view of tort law as a core state interest.
Congress has the power to displace state lawmaking power in any area
in which Congress has regulatory authority. The power of preemption stems
from the Supremacy Clause, which proscribes any state law that is "to the
[c]ontrary" of federal law. 42 In M'Culloch v. Maryland14 3 and Gibbons v.
Ogden,'" Chief Justice Marshall interpreted the Supremacy Clause to prohibit
mere "interference" with federal law. 145 Preemption may be complete or
partial, express or implied. 146 Thus, the preemption power allows Congress
142. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, c1. 2.
143.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
144. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
145. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 3"(1824) ("The power to regulate
commerce, so far as it extends, is exclusively vested in Congress, and no part of it can be
exercised by a state."); M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316,330 (1819) (stating that
"a constitutional act [of Congress] .. . cannot be either defeated or impeded by acts of state
legislation").
146. Thus, Congress may decide to occupy an entire field of regulation or preempt state
law only within certain bounds. For example, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA) completely preempts the field of employee welfare benefit plans. ERISA, 29
U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994). See N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 656 (1995) (stating that ERISA's preemption clause indicates
congressional intent to "establish the regulation of employee welfare benefit plans 'as exclusively a federal concern'" (citation omitted)). An example of partial preemption is the Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986, 5 U.S.C. §§ 4401-4408 (1994).
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to displace state law whether or not Congress has even exercised its regulatory
authority. In theory, this broad proscription would allow courts to strike down

vast numbers of state laws.
Preemption comes from the Constitution or derives from statute. Labor
law is the classic example of the latter. Under the common law of many
states, labor organizing and picketing were torts or crimes. Congress made the
decision to legalize unions. 47 Put plainly, the congressional decision would
be ineffective if the states, employing their community norms, could punish
people for exercising their rights under the federal statutes. Thus, there is
broad federal preemption of labor activity.14s It is important, however, to note
that the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized a state role in regulating
labor activity that does not call into question the federally-created legitimacy
of the activity as such. 49 In other areas of the law, such as obscenity, the
Court has relied on the states to help define the federal interest. 50
See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518 (1992) (delineating the partial preemption of state law remedies by the Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education
Act of 1986). Furthermore, courts can infer preemption from a scheme of national regulation, even if Congress has not expressed an intent to preempt the field. See Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) ("The scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.").
Generally, the Supreme Court applies a three-part test to determine whether state law has
been trumped by federal law. First, the Court looks to see whether Congress explicitly has
expressed an intent to preempt state law. See English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79
(1990) (explaining that "Congress can define explicitly the extent to which its enactments
preempt state law"). Second, if there is no express preemption, the Court looks to whether there
is a direct conflict between the exercise of state and federal regulation. See id. at 79 (stating that
"state law is preempted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law"). Third, even in
the absence of express preemption or direct conflict, the Court will ascertain whether state
regulatory authority is preempted because Congress has "occupied the field." See id. (stating
that "state law is preempted where it regulates a field that Congress intended the Federal
Government to occupy exclusively").
147. See Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151,157 (1998) (creating workers' right to form unions).
148. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, Milmen's Union, Local 2020 v. Garmon, 359
U.S. 236, 24445 (1959) (citing reasons for federal preemption of labor activity).
149. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters,
436 U.S. 180, 198 (1978) (deciding that state action was not preempted because Sears was
challenging location of picketing and not whether federal labor law protected picketing); United
Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 721 (1966) (stating that state jurisdiction has prevailed
in situations involving traditional tort remedies for consequences of violence and imminent
threats because state's interest in maintenance of domestic peace is not overridden in absence
of expressed congressional direction).
150. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (stating that test for obscenity is based
on "contemporary community standards" (citations omitted)).
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To avoid unnecessary displacement of state police power,' the Court
has construed congressional intent narrowly."5 2 At bottom, federalism is the
root of the presumption against preemption, and
[tihe signal virtues of this presumption are its placement of the power of
preemption squarely in the hands of Congress, which is far more suited
than the Judiciary to strike the appropriate state/federal balance (particularly in areas of traditional state regulation), and its requirement that
Congress speak clearly when exercising that power.'
Nonetheless, the preemption power remains quite broad and some commentators argue that it intrudes upon state lawmaking abilities and is an invasion
from the Court's own making."5 4
151. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) ("[W]e start with the
assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."). The Court also has
stressed the need to avoid leaving a regulatory vacuum. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State
Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 207-08 (1983) ("It is almost
inconceivable that Congress would have left a regulatory vacuum...
152. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,485 (1996) (applying presumption against
preemption in construing congressional intent to displace state police powers); Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992) ("Congress' enactment of a provision defining
the preemptive reach of a statute implies that matters beyond that reach are not preempted.");
cf Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 858 (2000) (construing federal arson criminal statute
as inapplicable to arson of owner-occupied residence). In Justice Stevens's concurrence to
Jones, he compared the presumption against preemption to the Court's narrow interpretation
of federal criminal laws that overlap with state authority:
The fact that petitioner received a sentence of 35 years in prison when the maximum penalty for the comparable state offense was only 10 years... illustrates how
a criminal law like this may effectively displace a policy choice made by the State.
Even when Congress has undoubted power to pre-empt local law, we have wisely
decided that "unless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to
have significantly changed the federal-state balance."
Id. at 859-60 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349
(1971)).
153. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 907 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
As Justice Stevens stated:
In this way, the structural safeguards inherent in the normal operation of the
legislative process operate to defend state interests from undue infringement ....
In addition, the presumption serves as a limiting principle that prevents federal
judges from running amok with our potentially boundless (and perhaps inadequately considered) doctrine of implied conflict pre-emption based on frustration
of purpose ....

Id.
154. See Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature ofPreemption,79 Co ELL L. REv. 767,80304 (1994) (arguing that preemption principles were introduced in 1912 Court decision); Stephen
Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalismand the Unshackling ofthe States, 64 U. CiE L. REv.

483,532-35 (1997) (arguing that preemption doctrine was product of Lochner Court).
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In a recent series of decisions starting with cases that involve federal
regulation of cigarette warnings, the Court has embarked on a complicated and
contentious analysis of preemption of common law tort claims. These decisions found that congressional or regulatory action preempts tort claims with
slightly different reasoning in each case.' 55 A large part of the debate concerns the strength of the presumption against preemption when the subject
matter involves preemption of common law remedies for compensating tort
victims - an area traditionally regarded as within the states' domain.
In 1992, the Supreme Court held that federal law preempted certain, but
not all, state failure-to-warn claims arising out of the sale of cigarettes. 56
Four years later, the Supreme Court confronted the question of federal preemption of state common law damages actions arising out of the use of
federally regulated medical devices. InMedronic,Inc. v. Lohr' 57 a majority
of the Justices agreed that the term "requirement" contained within the preemption clause of the relevant statute encompassed not just state positive
enactments, but also legal requirements arising from the application of state
common law.' 58 Ultimately, however, the Court held that the federal statute
preempted none of the plaintiff's claims on a variety of other grounds. 5 9 In
a plurality opinion authored by Justice Stevens, four justices described the
role of the states as "independent sovereigns in our federal system."' " Citing
a presumption against preemption of state police powers used by the Cipollone Court to narrowly construe federal regulation of cigarette advertising,
the Medtronic Court found that this "approach is consistent with both federalism concerns and the historic primacy of state regulation of matters of health
and safety.""' Thus, the plurality found it "implausible" that "Congress
155. See Geier, 529 U.S. at 886 (upholding preemption of lawsuit claiming that car without
airbag was defective); CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 675 (1993) (concluding
that federal regulation governing maximum train speed preempted tort claim that train's speed
was excessive); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 506 (1992) (upholding
preemption of certain common law tort claims against cigarette manufacturers); cf Merrell Dow
Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986) (refusing to find federal question jurisdiction
where plaintiffs incorporated federal standard in state-law private action for damages from
concurring)
ingestion of Bendectin during pregnancy); Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 503 (Breyer, J.,

(stating that Medical Device Act will sometimes preempt state law tort suit).
156. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 530-31 (1992).
157. 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
concurring in part);
158. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 504-05 (1996) (Breyer, J.,
joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia and Thomas, JJ., concurring
Id. at 509-11 (O'Connor, J.,

in part and dissenting in part).
159. See id.at 492-502 (holding that plaintiff's claims based on state's common law theory
of defective design and common law manufacturing and labeling requirements were not preempted).
160. Id. at 465.
161. Id. at485.
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effectively precluded state courts from affording state consumers any protection from injuries resulting from a defective medical device. 162 Instead the Court emphasized that it would be "to say the least, 'difficult to
believe that Congress would, without comment, remove all means of judicial
recourse for those injured by illegal conduct,' and it would take language
much plainer6 3than the text of § 360k to convince us that Congress intended
that result."'
Recently, in Geier v. American HondaMotor Co., " the Court held that
a plaintiff's lawsuit alleging that her car was defective because it lacked a
driver's side air bag was preempted. 6" Finding no express preemption because of a savings clause in the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act of 1966,'" the Court nonetheless found that the claim was preempted
because it conflicted with the objectives of a federal regulation. 67 The dissent
emphasized that the case raised important federalism concerns - concerns that
create a presumption that state laws "particularly those, such as the provision
of tort remedies to compensate for personal injuries, that are within the scope
of the States' historic police power are not to be preempted by a federal
statute unless it is the clear and manifest purpose of Congress to do so."'"
162.
163.

Id. at 487.
Id. (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984)). Yet, this is

what the Court has effectively achieved in Alden. See supra notes 115-19 and accompanying
text (stating that Congress cannot compel states to defend federal claims in state courts).
164.
529 U.S. 861 (2000).
165. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861,886 (2000).
166.
15 U.S.C. § 1381 (1988) (repealed 1994).
167. It held that the presence of a savings clause "does not bar the ordinary working of
conflict preemption principles," rejecting the dissent's argument that a "special burden" should
apply when a savings clause has been included in the legislation. Geier, 529 U.S. at 869. The
dissent argued that the savings clause at issue showed congressional intent to preserve the state
tort law and therefore the party favoring preemption had a special burden to show that valid
federal purposes would be frustrated if that state law were not preempted. Id. at 898-99
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 894 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But Justice Breyer's majority opinion did note that
Geier "leav[es] ...state tort law to operate... where federal law creates only a floor, i.e., a
minimum safety standard." Id. at 868; see Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344, 387
(2000) (Breyer, J., concurring) ("'[C]ommon sense and sound policy' suggest that federal minimum safety standards should not pre-empt a state tort action claiming that in the particular
circumstance a railroad's warning device remains inadequate."). Lower courts have begun to
interpret Geier as strongly suggesting that a minimum federal safety standard will rarely, if ever,

impliedly preempt more rigorous common law safety obligations. See Harris v. Great Dane
Trailers, Inc., 234 F.3d. 398, 402 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding that National Traffic and Motor

Safety Act did not preempt state products liability claim on lack of reflective tape on vehicle);
Leipart v. Guardian Indus., Inc., 234 F.3d. 1063, 1068 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding that
Consumer Product Safety Act did not preempt products liability claim based on glass shower
door).
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Continuing its solicitude of federal regulation in the face of state tort
suits, the Court held this past term that claims alleging that the manufacturer
of orthopedic bone screws had made fraudulent representations to the Food
and Drug Administration in the course of obtaining approval to market the
screws were preempted impliedly.' 69 No presumption against preemption
applied in the case because policing fraud against federal agencies is not a
field traditionally occupied by the states. 70 The Court distinguished Silkwood
v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 7 ' a case that refused to find preemption of tort claims
brought by an employee against a nuclear power plant, because it addressed
traditional state tort law principles of the duty of care and not on a fraud-onthe-federal-agency theory.'72 The Court found that the plaintiffs' allegations
conflicted with federal law in two ways.' 73 First, they undermined the FDA's
control over its regulatory responsibilities by "dramatically increasing the
burdens" of regulated entities that would be forced to comply with the FDA's
74
detailed regulatory regime in the shadow of fifty States' tort regimes.'
Second, they deprived the FDA of the "flexibility" to respond to alleged
misconduct as it deemed appropriate, which the Court found to be a "critical
component of the statutory and regulatory framework under which the FDA
pursues difficult (and often competing) objectives."'7 5 The Court worried that
state tort claims would impede competition and delay doctors' ability to
prescribe off-label uses of drugs and medical devices.' 76
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment without joining the opinion
because he found that causation could not be established. Justice Stevens
argued, however, that if the FDA determined before the litigation began that
fraud had occurred during the approval process and had removed the offending product from the market, state damages would supplement, rather than
conflict with, federal enforcement. In those cases, the majority's position
would leave parties injured by fraudulent representations without a remedy."'
Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341,353 (2001).
169.
170. Id. at 347.
464 U.S. 238 (1984)
171.
172. Further, it found that in Silkwood, the Court had specific statutory evidence that
Congress did not intend to preclude tort remedies, whereas Congress clearly intended that the
Medical Device Act be enforced exclusively by the federal government. Buckman, 531 U.S. at
352.
173. Id. at 349-50.
174. Id. at 350. The Court was also concerned about imposing "additional burdens" on the

FDA, because regulated entities would "have an incentive to submit a deluge of information that
the Administration neither wants nor needs." Id. at 351.
175.

Id. at 349.

176. Id.
177. Id. at 354-55 (Stevens, J., concurring). Inan unusual alliance, Justice Thomas joined
Justice Stevens in his concurrence.
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Inherent in the spate of decisions involving preemption of tort claims is
a fundamental tension between federalism and uniformity. On the one hand,
providing a remedy to persons injured by defective products is viewed as a
local, not federal, concern that should be reserved to the states under their
police powers. On the other hand, as many product manufacturers' markets
expand from a local to a national and even global scale, Congress has become
increasingly concerned about the need for uniform national standards.17 The
tension between these competing considerations surfaced in 1999 when both
houses introduced legislation that sought to limit Congress's and federal
agencies' ability to preempt state and local tort laws." 9 An unusual alliance
between conservative advocates of states rights and liberals interested in
enhancing environmental protection through more stringent state laws sponsored the legislation. Business groups opposed the legislation, alleging that
it would subject businesses to a patchwork of different state standards for their
goods and services."8 ' The business view ultimately prevailed and the legislation was dropped - at least for the time being.
Thus, despite the failure of most federal laws and regulations to provide
a private compensation remedy, the Supreme Court's recent trend suggests
It also
that it is open to greater federal preemption of state tort suits.'
suggests that the Court may not view tort law in the same category as other
areas like criminal law in terms of representing a core state sovereign interest.
Statutory language, federal regulation, and agency intent vary from product
to product; thus, although courts' examination of the preemption question will
continue to vary, preemption has become as strong a threat to common law
torts as direct federalization of law through federal legislation."8 2 Both areas
178. See, e.g., Virus-Serum-Toxin Act, 21 U.S.C. § 151-159(1999) (stating that legislative
history of 1985 amendments to Act shows Congress's intent to establish "uniform national
standards" for all animal vaccines marketed in United States).
179.
S.REP. No. 106-59, at 1 (1999).
180.
Cindy Skrzycki, The Chamber Reached a Sticking Point, WASH. POST, Sept. 17,
1999, at El.
181.
Prior to this recent trend, the Court switched back and forth between preempting and
preserving state tort claims. See Betsy J. Grey, Make CongressSpeak Clearly: FederalPreemption of State Tort Claims, 77 B.U. L. REV. 559, 560 (1997). This reflected a switch in
emphasis from uniformity to ensuring private damage remedies. Id. at 559-65.
182. Related to a preemption defense, a regulatory compliance defense would allow defendants to avoid liability in tort litigation by presenting evidence that its products or actions complied with relevant regulatory requirements. Although scholars and advocates of tort reform
have pressed for a regulatory compliance defense for several years, see generally Lars Noah,
Rewarding Regulatory Compliance: The Pursuitof Symmetry in ProductsLiability, 88 GEO.
L.J. 2147 (2000) (arguing in favor of defense of regulatory compliance in tort actions), no jurisdiction has yet adopted a general regulatory compliance defense. See Doyle v. Volkswagenwerk
Aktiengesellschaft, 481 S.E. 2d 518, 521 (Ga. 1997) (ruling that compliance with federal safety
belt standards did not preclude liability for design defect as matter of law); Gonzales v. Surgidev
Corp., 899 P.2d 576, 591 (N.M. 1991) (ruling that compliance with FDA regulation was not
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raise serious questions regarding the proper balance between federal and state
powers over tort law. They also demand an examination of the values of
federalism.
IV The Values of Federalism
Although this Article focuses on the constitutionality of congressional
replacement of a particular state tort law, it is hard to divorce that question
from the consideration of whether the exercise of that power is sound as a
matter of policy. Thus, in addition to asking whether Congress has the power
to act in a given area under the Constitution, it is important to ask whether
OF TORTS § 288C (1965) ("Compliance
with a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation does not prevent a finding of negligence where a reasonable man would take additional precautions."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: PRODS. LIA. § 4 (1998) ("[C]ompliance with an applicable product safety statute or
administrative regulation... does not preclude as a matter of law a finding of product defect.").
This is in contrast to the way noncompliance with regulatory standards is treated. Generally, jurisdictions treat unexcused violations of statutes as negligence per se. Although courts
generally have refused to view regulatory compliance as a complete defense to liability, see
Wash. State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., 858 P.2d 1054, 1069 (Wash. 1993)
(refusing to allow evidence of compliance with FDA regulations to provide relief from liability
for failure to adequately warn because Court found that the FDA standards are only minimum
requirements), some courts allow regulatory compliance to serve as some evidence of due care,
see United Blood Servs. v. Quintana, 827 P.2d 509, 525 (Colo. 1992) (holding that compliance
with FDA's regulations for blood banking was some evidence of due care, but not absolute
proof); Jackson v. Spagnola, 503 A.2d 944, 948 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (holding that compliance
with automobile safety standards is properly introduced into evidence, but cannot create
immunity to strict liability), others give it substantial weight, see Lorenzo v. Celotex Corp., 896
F.2d 148, 150-51 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that compliance with safety regulation is strong and
substantial evidence of lack of product defect), and in a few cases, courts have allowed regulatory compliance to serve as an absolute defense to liability. See Sims v. Washex Mach. Corp.,
932 S.W.2d 559, 565 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) ("Compliance with government regulations is strong
evidence, although not conclusive, that a machine is defectively designed."); Ramirez v. Plough,
Inc., 863 P.2d 167, 176 (Cal. 1994) ("[T]he prudent course is to adopt for tort purposes the
existing legislative and administrative standard of care on this issue."); Dentson v. Eddins & Lee
Bus Sales, Inc., 491 So. 2d 942, 944 (Ala. 1986) (noting that legislative standard not requiring
seatbelts on school buses is conclusive on non-defectiveness). In addition, several states have
adopted limited forms of a regulatory compliance defense. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-116-105
(Michie 1999) (interpreting section as not providing complete defense to liability and stating
that regulatory compliance is evidence of non-defectiveness); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403
(2001) (stating that compliance creates rebuttable presumption); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-4
(West 2000) (providing rebuttable presumption of adequacy where product warning complies
with Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act or Public Health Service Act); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2307.801(c)(lXa) (2000) (barring recovery of punitive damages where product complies with
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Actor Public Health Service Act); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.927 (1999)
(same); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-2 (2000) (same); Buchanna v. Diehl Mach., Inc., 98 F.3d
366, 370 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating that evidence of compliance with applicable industry standards
at time of manufacture gives jury competing evidence from which to choose). Manufacturers
and many commentators continue to argue that regulatory compliance should be a complete
defense to tort liability.

complete defense to liability); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
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Congress should be allowed to act. Also, who should decide whether Congress or the states have overstepped their bounds, i.e., should the courts decide
this or will the political process provide a sufficient check on their powers?
Traditionally, the Supreme Court cites three values of federalism: it
provides a check on the tyranny of federal power, it fosters governments that
are more responsive than Congress to the needs of local citizens, and it uses
the states as laboratories to develop new approaches to social problems. 1" 3
"[The] state/federal division of authority protects liberty - both by restricting
the burdens that government can impose from a distance and by facilitating
citizen participation in government that is closer to home."'" 4
The Framers of the Constitution thought that by separating powers
among the branches of federal government and between the states and federal
government, the structure of the government itself would become the best
protection against a tyrannical federal government."' The Framers assumed
that most governance would take place at the state and local levels., Thus,
granting the federal government limited powers as well as creating two
separate governing systems would necessarily restrict the power of the central
government. Alexander Hamilton explained that the "necessity of local
administrations for local purposes,
would be a complete barrier against the
86
oppressive use of such a power."'
A second value of federalism the Court often cites is that the state governments are closer to - and therefore are more likely to be responsive to - the
local needs and desires of the public. As Professor David Shapiro explains,
"one of the stronger arguments for a decentralized political structure is that,
to the extent the electorate is small, and elected representatives are thus more
immediately accountable to individuals and their concerns, government is
brought closer to the people, and democratic ideals are more fully realized."'" 7
The smaller the governing unit, the more likely it is to be responsive to the
needs of the citizenry.""8 Thus, if a majority of citizens in Arizona favor
punitive damages for medical malpractice suits but a majority in New Hamp183. Gregory v. Ashcrofl, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991); Erwin Chemerinaky, The Values of
Federalism,47 FLA. L. REV. 499, 524 (1995).
184. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,655 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
185. Chemerinsky, supra note 183, at 525.
186. THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 197 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Professor Chemerinsky rejects this rationale as anachronistic, however, especially in light of the
modem national economy and the development of extensive federal regulations. Chemerinsky,
supranote 183, at 526.
187.

DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALooUE 91-92 (1995).

188. As Professor Michael McConnell explained: "So long as preferences for government
policies are unevenly distributed among the various localities, more people can be satisfied by
decentralized decision making than by a single national authority." Michael W. McConnell,
Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. Ci. L. REV. 1484, 1493-94 (1987)
(reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: EVALUATING THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN (1987)).
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shire do not, it is easier to accommodate the divergent interests at the state
rather than the federal level." 9
The third argument made in support of federalism has its genesis in
Justice Brandeis's famous observation about the states as laboratories for

experimentation:
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious
consequences to the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal
system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as
a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk
to the rest of the country. 190
Other, more recent Supreme Court decisions have invoked similar arguments
in support of federalism. For example, Justice O'Connor praised the experimentation of states by noting in her dissent that the "[C]ourt's decision
undermines the most valuable aspects of our federalism. Courts and commentators frequently have recognized that the fifty States have served as laboratories for the development of new social, economic, and political ideas."''
Some modem theorists argue that placement of power at the state level
is important because it allows those who disagree with certain policies, but are
politically powerless to change them to leave the jurisdiction or choose not to
-locate there in the first place.' 92 Some commentators view this possibility of
189. Professor Tom Stacy points out that this rationale works best when majoritarian
preferences differ from state to state. But in such a case, he argues, national authority is also
desirable because these state majorities can be prevented from too easily dominating minority
interests by enlarging the polity and thereby making them lose their majority status. Thus he
questions whether curbing the power of factions on the state level is more important or whether
diversity is the stronger interest. Tom Stacy, Whose Interests Does FederaismProtect?,45 U.

KAN. L. REV. 1185, 1193 (1997).
Professor Chemerinsky suggests, however, that special interest groups may dominate
government at the local level, thus defeating the purpose of avoiding tyrannical rule by maximizing electoral responsiveness. Chemerinsky, supra note 183, at 527 (citing City of Richmond
v. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495-96 (1989), and expressing concern about dangers of
special interest capture at local level). Relying on the work of Professor Shapiro, Professor
Chemerinsky also questions whether local governments are inherently more responsive than a
greater level of government. Id. at 528.
190. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
191. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742,787-88 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting inpart);
see also Gregory v. Ashcrofl, 501 U.S. 452, 458(1991) (noting that federalist structure allows
for innovation and experimentation in government); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 568 n.13 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("The Court does not explain how
leaving the States virtually at the mercy of the Federal government, without recourse to judicial
review, will enhance their opportunities to experiment and serve as 'laboratories.'"); Stacy,
supra note 189, at 1192.
192. See MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CO NSTIrTrONAs POLTICAL STRucTuRE 25 (1995)
(noting that interstate mobility allows citizens to escape tyrannical government); RICHARD A.
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exit as a liberty-promoting advantage 93 while others view it as encouraging
an undesirable race to the bottom. 94
In supporting the value of federalism all theories make one basic assumption: that states have diverging, distinct views on the issue at hand. Thus,
states may take differing views on welfare reform or the legalization of
gambling. Whether this assumption holds true in the area oftorts is debatable.
Some say that "[t]he voices of the quasi-sovereigns that are the states of the
United States sing negligence with a different pitch."'9 5 Others assume there
is a national consensus on tort law in various areas.' 96 As such, I examine
below whether state interests are distinct in the torts sphere.
V Diversity of Views in State Tort Law
Historically, the states have taken distinct views on various tort issues.'
One of the best known examples involves liability for water brought upon
one's land. In Rylands v. Fletcher,'" the English court held that an individual
would be held strictly liable for damage from any water that escaped from the
property owner's land.' When the issue was examined in the United States,
the English holding met with varying degrees of enthusiasm. The western
states, in particular, largely rejected the strict liability theory, finding negligence better suited to their needs:
In Texas we have conditions very different from those which obtain in
England. A large portion of Texas is an arid or semi-arid region.... The
country is almost without streams; and without the storage of water from
rainfall in basins constructed for the purpose, or to hold waters pumped
from the earth, the great livestock industry of West Texas must perish. No
EPSTEIN,Exit Rights UnderFederalism,55 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 147, 150 (1992) (stating
that exit rights under federalism offer important and indispensable safeguard against government
abuse).
193. DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 76-77 (1991)
(stating that Richard Epstein "makes no bones about the fact that his support for federalism is
directly linked with his rejection of government regulation").
194. SHAPIRO, supra note 187, at 42-43; see Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and
Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95
COLuM. L. REV. 1001, 1011-13 (1995) (noting that decentralization may lead to state government deregulation in attempt to promote economic development).
195. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1301 (7th Cir. 1995).
196. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 690, 713 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)
(noting likelihood that state court would look to national consensus to guide tort action).
197, See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6, 145 (1969)
(stating that rights and liabilities of parties in tort are governed generally by law of state which
has most significant relationship to occurrence and parties).
198. 3 L.R.E. & I. App. 330 (H.L. 1868).
199. Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 L.R.E. & I. App. 330 (H.L. 1868).
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such condition obtains in England. With us the storage of water is a
natural or necessary and common use of the land, necessarily within the
contemplation of the state and its grantees when grants were made, and
obviously the rule announced inRylands v. Fletcher, predicated upon different conditions, can have no application here.2'
Thus, the rule was tailored to meet the economic conditions of the region.
Another significant historical example is the distinctive approaches states take
to comparative negligence. 1 For example, states' positions vary on the
relative degree of negligence allowed to the plaintiff before the plaintiff s
fault bars recovery. 2'
State courts historically have "sung at different pitches" in another
important sense: as initiators of "new torts."2 3 There are various examples
of this exercise; several significant ones include intentional infliction 2of°6
20 5
emotional distress, 2 4 medical monitoring claims, and invasion of privacy.
Courts have also adapted traditional torts to new situations.2° Furthermore,
200.

Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 96 S.W.2d 221,226 (Tex. 1936).

201.

See generally David C. Sobelsohn, Pure vs. Modified Comparative Fault: Notes

on the Debate, 34 EMORY L.J. 65 (1985) (surveying various states' comparative fault regimes).
202.

Id. at 67.

203. Some will argue that new torts are merely old wine in a new bottle, but whether these
are described as new torts or wrinkles on old ones is not significant in recognizing that
common law courts are engaged in the development of causes of actions. Professor Bernstein
defines new torts as those that are "both novel and free-standing" and "accepted... into the

fold of American torts." Anita Bernstein, The New-Tort Cenbiafuge, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 413,
414 (1999).
204. See State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 282, 284-85 (Cal. 1952)
(recognizing tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress); RsTATE
rIr(SECOND) OF
TORTS § 46 (1978) (same). The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, for example,
was not even recognized until 1948. W. PAGE KEETONETAL., PROSsERANDKEETONONTORTS,
§ 12, at 64 (5th ed.).
205. See, e.g., Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d. 424,430 (W. Va. 1999)
(recognizing claim for medical monitoring as "proper subject of compensatory damages").
206. See Haynes v. Alfred A. Knoff, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1229 (7th Cir. 1993) (describing
many aspects of tort comprising common law "right of privacy"). The tort of invasion of
privacy is usually traced to a law review article written by Louis D. Brandeis and his law
partner, Samuel D. Warren, entitled The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890). See
William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAWY. L. REV. 383, 383-89 (1960) (describing development of
right to privacy in common law courts).
207. See Ford v. Revlon, 734 P.2d 580, 585-86 (Ariz. 1987) (adopting intentional infliction of emotional distress tort to sexual harassment in workplace); Fisher v. Carrousel Motor
Hotel, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627, 629 (Tex. 1967) (finding battery when employee of hotel snatched
plate from plaintiff, declaring that hotel did not serve "Negroes"); Fibreboard Corp. v. Pool,
813 S.W.2d 658, 675 (Tex. App. 1991) (allowing jury instruction on fear of cancer as mental
anguish in determining damages).
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lawyers and academics constantly attempt to persuade courts to adopt new tort
causes of action.2 °s
Examples of these differences in approach to civil standards of behavior

abound today.

°9

Perhaps most indicative evidence of the strength of this

208. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults,
Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 179-81 (1982) (regarding
racial hate speech); Rory Lancman, ProtectingSpeech from Private Abridgement: Introducing the Tort of Suppression, 25 Sw. U. L. REV. 223, 238-44 (1996) (regarding suppression
of speech).
The assumption here is that state courts or legislatures make new law and the distribution
of power between state courts and Congress creates the tension that this Article addresses. This
is not to ignore, however, that the civil jury, another entity within its own right, has an impact
on the creation of new torts. This distinguishes our common law tort system from the tort law
of other nations. Some critics find this unique feature to create instability or even lawlessness.
Bernstein, supra note 203, at 419 & n.35.
209. A classic example is found in the development of products liability law. States require
varying tests to prove a design defect. Some states allow proof through a consumers expectation
test while others do not. Some states allow the use of a risk/utility balancing test, without proof
of a reasonable alternative design, while others do not require such proof. Indeed, this was one
of the major controversies of the Restatement of Torts (Third). RESTATEMENT (THID) TORTS:
PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. 6 (1998); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, The Products
Liability Restatement in the Courts: An InitialAssessment, 27 WM. MrrCH.L L. REV.7, 11
(2000). Furthermore, states differ on whether to use comparative fault in the strict liability
setting of products liability. See generally Gary T. Schwartz, Consideringthe ProperFederal
Role in American Tort Law, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 917 (1996) (discussing diversity of approaches in
products liability law).
Similarly, the area of negligent infliction of emotional distress has developed in a nonuniform fashion among the states. Some states extend recovery to bystanders only if they are
in the "zone of danger," while others use a "foreseeability" approach and reject the zone of
danger test. Compare Portee v. Jaffee, 417 A-2d 521, 526 (N.J. 1980).(stating multi-factored
foresecability test), and Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 920 (Cal. 1968) (same), with Bovsun v.
Sanperi, 461 N.E.2d 843, 848 (N.Y. 1984) (announcing zone of danger rule). Along the same
lines, states take different approaches to whether unmarried couples can recover for emotional
distress from witnessing harm suffered by another. Compare Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582,
588 (Cal. 1988) (dismissing claims for emotional distress), with Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d
372, 379 (N.J. 1994) (allowing fiancee to bring claim). In protecting non-physical direct injuries against negligent interference, courts range from using a zone of danger test, see K.A.C.
v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553, 559 (Minn. 1995) (requiring showing of fear of physical injury),
to suggesting a broader foreseeability based limitation, see Gammon v. Osteopathic Hosp., 534
A.2d 1282, 1285 (Me. 1987) (foreseeability based on ordinary sensitive person).
Another example lies in the area of obligations of landowners. Two distinct approaches
have emerged: the traditional approach varies the duty of the landowner depending on whether
it is owed to a trespasser, licensee, or invitee. See, e.g., Carter v. Kinney, 896 S.W.2d 926, 928
(Mo. 1995) (using category approach). The minority view has adopted a foreseeability-based
approach. See Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968) (using foreseeability
inquiry). And some states have created an exception to the minority view exempting trespassers
from the foreseeability inquiry. See Heins v. Webster County, 552 N.W.2d 51, 54 (Neb. 1996)
(listing states that have refused to abandon trespasser category).
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diversity is the problem faced by plaintiffs seeking class action certification
for mass tort actions brought in federal court. Plaintiffs repeatedly have
argued that class certification should be granted, despite the fact that plaintiffs
from different states in these diversity actions normally would have the
negligence and damages law of their own state apply to their claims because
tort law among the states has become nondistinctive. Courts generally reject
this argument.210 As Judge Posner explained:
If one instruction on negligence will serve to instruct the jury on the legal
standard of every state of the United States applicable to a novel claim,
implying that the claim despite its controversiality would be decided idenMarket share liability, which expanded the notion of cause in fact, has developed among
the states in a variety of ways. After California initiated the approach in Sindell v. Abbott
Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, 937 (Cal. 1980), courts in other jurisdictions reacted to it in
numerous ways, ranging from rejecting the approach, adopting it, or modifying it. Some courts
declined to find any judicial remedy. See Zaffi v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241,246 (Mo.
1984) ("[TIhe law does not guarantee relief to every deserving plaintiff... [the] plaintiff must
show with reasonable certainty that... the defendant is liable. ..."); Mulcahy v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 386 N.W.2d 67, 75-76 (Iowa 1986) (declining to apply market share-liability theory against
manufacturers of DES when plaintiff could not prove which manufacturer sold DES in question). Other courts extended the concept by using risk shares rather than market shares. See
Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 342 N.W.2d 37,53 (Wis. 1984) (employing "market share alternative
liability"); Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d 368, 382 (Wash. 1984). In addition, other courts
disallowed exculpatory evidence when the defendant is part of the relevant market. See
Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1078 (N.Y. 1989). Some courts (like those in
New York and California) have defined the relevant market as national whereas other courts
(like those in Wisconsin and Washington) have defined the market on a case-by-case basis.
Many states rejected application of this concept outside of the DES setting, although a lower
court in New York recently extended the market share concept to lawsuits brought against gun
manufacturers. Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 843 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), rev'd, 244
F.3d 26 (2d Cir. 2001).
Another example of diverse approaches lies in the area of damages. For example, courts
struggle with whether to award damages for both pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of
life. CompareMcDougald v. Garber, 536 N.E.2d 372, 376-77 (N.Y. 1989) (refusing to allow
separate damages), with Fantozzi v. Sandusky Cement Prods. Co., 597 N.E. 474,486 (Ohio
1992) (allowing separate charge to the jury). They also differ in whether damages lie for loss
of consortium beyond claims brought by spouses. Compare Borer v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 563
P.2d 858, 865 (Cal. 1977) (refusing to extend loss of consortium claim to young children of
injured mother), with Berger v. Weber, 303 N.W.2d 424, 425 (Mich. 1981) (allowing claim to
go forward).
One author has studied the regional differences of tort law for New York. See William
E. Nelson, From Fairnessto Efflciency: The Transformationof Tort Law inNew York 1920-

80,47 BUFF.L. REV.117 (1999).
210. See, e.g., Castano v. The Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 741-42 (5th Cir. 1996)
(denying class certification); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, 51 F.3d 1293, 1302 (7th Cir. 1995)
(same); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 165 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting
possibility of differences inproducts liability law).
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tically in all 50 states and the District of Columbia, one wonders what the
Supreme Court thought it was doing in the Erie case when it held that it
was unconstitutional for federal courts in diversity cases to apply general
common law rather than the common law of the state whose law would
apply if the case were being tried in state rather than federal court."1 I
Indeed, as a result of this problem, many class action lawsuits are certified
only on a statewide basis.2 12
These differences in judicially crafted tort law have been complemented
by state legislative changes, particularly in the area of tort reform. Over the
last decade, legislatures have enacted wide-ranging laws in the name of
reform, ranging from the elimination or capping of punitive damages for
various types of lawsuits, to changes to or the elimination of joint and several
liability, to modifying the collateral source rule and removing certain claims
for intangible damages.2 3
Although the range of the diversity in states' approaches to tort liability
is obvious, it is less obvious whether protecting this diversity promotes a
federalism interest. It is unclear whether differences reflect regional social,
economic, and cultural differences or if they simply reflect the views of the
individual justices of the state supreme court who voted in a particular case.
Furthermore, a state legislature's adoption of a cap on punitive damages in
malpractice cases may be more indicative of the views of state legislators who
have been influenced by special interest groups than of the views of a majority
of the populace. For example, most citizens of New York probably did not
have a view on whether exculpatory evidence should-be allowed in a market
share liability DES case.214
211. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, 51 F.3d at 1300.
212. See, e.g., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 672 So.2d 39,42 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1996) (denying class certification).
213. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-544, 6-5-547 (1993) (limiting noneconomic losses to
$400,000 and total judgment to $1 million in medical malpractice cases); ALASKA STAT.
§ 09.17.010(b) (Michie 2000) ($500,000 limit on noneconomic damages); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
§ 12-2506 (2001) (abolishing joint and several liability); CAL. CIrv. CODE § 3333.2 (West 1997)
(placing $250,000 cap on noneconomic injuries in medical malpractice cases); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-21-102.5(3) (West 2000) (limiting noneconomic damages to $250,000 unless court
finds justification through clear and convincing evidence, thereby increasing limit to $500,000);
IDAHO CODE § 6-1603(1) (Michie 1998) (capping noneconomic damages at $400,000, adjusted
annually for wage inflation); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-108 (2000) (limiting nonpunitive, noneconomic damages to $500,000); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.560(1) (1999) (limiting
noneconomic damages to $500,000); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (Michie 2000) (capping
recovery in medical malpractice actions to a total of S1.5 million, increased annually); WIs. STAT.

ANN. § 893-55 (West 1996) (limiting total noneconomic damages to $350,000, adjusted annually).
214. See Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E. 2d 1029,1078 (N.Y. 1989), cert denied,

518

59 WASH. &LEE L. REV 475 (2002)

Yet a representative democracy does not require that citizens have
specific views on these issues and, as Professor Rabin explains, the legislative
adoption of caps on damages or a statute forbidding the use of the hindsight
rule in products liability warning cases represents democracy at work."'
Although it may not be a perfect example of representational government, it
reflects local interests voiced through legislation.
If this is true of state legislation, it is even more true of a state's common
law of torts. Of course, the citizen representation value is less apparent in
judicial law-making. The tradition of common law development of torts,
however, weighs heavily. Voters can play a role by overturning a common
law ruling by voting to pass a law. Even more importantly, the common law
has been woven over hundreds of years in response to perceived states'
interests and works as an integrated whole.21 6 Indeed, the Restatement of
Conflicts supports this conclusion by recognizing that some tort principles are
so important to the forum state's public policy that conflicting state law will
not apply even if another jurisdiction has more substantial contacts with the
tort.217 Because diversity in state tort law exists, and the differences in viewpoints represent democracy at work, the question becomes whether that
interest is sufficiently strong to withstand being superseded by federal legislation in the area.
Vi Foundations of Tort Law
Although the new federalism decisions, when defining congressional
power under the Commerce Clause, do not declare certain areas traditionally
regulated by the states as inviolate, the decisions clearly consider whether the
federal statute regulates an area traditionally regulated by the states. As
discussed above, examples cited by the Court of areas traditionally regulated
by the states include family law, criminal law, and property. Are these
categories merely determined by tradition and fiat, or is some broader principle at work?
Investigation into the historical and philosophic roots of tort law is
critical for determining whether tort law belongs in this group. This Section
sketches the early roots of tort law in criminal law and the two paradigms
underlying the philosophic understandings of tort law: the "corrective" justice
493 U.S. 944 (1989) (finding no exculpation for defendant who, although member of market
producing DES, appeared not to have caused particular plaintiff's injury).
215. See generally Robert L. Rabin, Federalism and the Tort System, 50 RUTGERS L. REV.
1, 11 (1997) '(noting legislature's choice from alternatives is more democratic than simply
adopting federal standard).
216. Id.
217. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFuCTOF LAWS § 145 cmts. c-d (1971).
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function of rectifying torts and the attempt to explain the development of torts
in economic terms.
Tort law, like its criminal law counterpart, began as local law reflecting
the customary practices of the community."s "Its Anglo-Saxon inheritance
gave it a customary quality; that is, it rested on long-established practices of
the community." 19 As is well established, in early English law there was no
distinction between tort law and criminal law.= One legal proceeding served
both the tort function of compensating and placating the family or clan of the
victim and the criminal function of compensating the king for disturbing his
peace." These payments, called bot and wite, were not contingent on proving
fault, but rather were exacted to appease the clan of the injured person and
limit feuding.' m Over time, the civil and criminal functions began to separate.
Although a duty to pay the full bot remained, one who was not blameworthy
sometimes was excused from paying the wite.m Thus, the early history oftort
law reflects the traditional purposes of tort law: punishment, compensation,
and regulation.
Itwas not until the 1617 case of Weaver v. Ward" ' that a court suggested
that one charged with trespass might be exonerated if he were "judged utterly
without ... fault. '.22 The punitive effect of the action was increasingly
limited by later courts to apply to those who were blameworthy in some
respect. The increasing amount of travel on the roads in the 1800s and the
corresponding rise in accident cases led the English courts to move toward a
reasonable care standard of duty.' In an early case signaling a move in this
direction, the court advised that people must "put up with such mischief as
reasonable care on the part of others cannot avoid."'
Although tort law thus moved away from the criminal law, it remains
rooted in seeking to punish those who violate societal norms. The punishment
element is less important in tort law than it is in criminal law, which may
218. Ronald W. Eades, Attempts to Federalize and Codify Tort Law, 36 TORT & INS. L.J.
1, 1 (2000) (citing KERMiT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR 11 (1989)).
219. HALL, supra note 218, at 11.
220.

See generally Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on the Role ofFault in the History of the

Common Law of Torts, 31 LA. L. REv. 1, 2 (1970) ("[A]ny distinction between crime and tort
was unknown.").
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id. at2.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 6.
80 Eng. Rep. 284 (LB. 1617) (quoted in Malone, supra note 220, at 16).

225.

Weaver v. Ward, 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (LB. 1617).

226.
227.

Malone, supra note 220, at 32.
Holmes v. Mather, L.R. 10 Ex. 261 (1875).
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reflect a different balance of private and public interests. However, it remains
a strong element in tort law, which suggests that tort law should be viewed

akin to criminal law as a regulatory area that should be protected from congressional invasion.
The traditional state role in both criminal and tort law reflects the sense
that a smaller community is better able to define and impose its own social
norms. Of course, a larger community can have social norms as well. As
such, we have federal laws on gun control and federal criminal law. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the federal law accurately and legitimately
represents the norms of the national community, in our system the individual
is expected to conform his behavior to the norms of both levels of society.'m
Separate responsibility to each sovereign is so deeply ingrained in our system
that it even overrides the Fifth Amendment principle of only one punishment
for a crime; the ban on double jeopardy almost never applies to successive
federal and state prosecutions.'m
As the federal system developed, the handling oftort law as well as criminal law feill to local government. Because local governments would bear the
burden of caring for the injured, it made sense to allow the local people to
determine who would bear the costs."3 Similarly, because local people would
pay the claim, it again was logical to allow the states to decide who should pay
for the losses.3 Thus, "[tjhroughout our history the several States have exercised their police powers to protect the health and safety of their citizens," 2
Holmes recognized that states play this role of defining and imposing
social norms in tort law as well as in criminal law. The standard for civil
liability, he insisted, is "whether his conduct would have been wrong in the
fair average member of the community, whom he is expected to equal at his
peril."23' 3 Drawing from his example and from criminal law we can recog228.

He is expected to conform even more, considering city ordinances, county health

codes, and so on.

229. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 131 (1959) ("Every citizen of the United States
is also a citizen of a State .... [Hie... owe[s] allegiance to two sovereigns, and may be liable
to punishment for an infraction of the laws of either." (citing Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14
How.) 13, 20 (1852))); Arizona v. Poland, 645 P.2d 784, 791 (Ariz. 1982) (following Bartkus
and holding that even when prior federal conviction rested on same facts as state conviction,
state conviction is not barred); see also United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 317 (1978)
(allowing second prosecution by United States after defendant had been convicted of lesser
included offense by Navajo Nation because same act may be offense against two sovereigns,
each with right to punish offender).

230.
231.

Eades, supra note 218, at 3-4.
Id.

232.
233.

Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,475 (1996).
OuVER WENDtEL HoLMES, J_., LectureIV: Fraud,Malice, and Intent- The Theory

of Torts 162 (1881).
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nize that normative rulemaking is the prerogative of every community to
which the tortfeasor belongs, barring constitutional limitations or preemption. 2Extensive literature addresses the theoretical basis for these social
norms of proper behavior in tort law.235 Two basic paradigms have emerged,
with many variations in each model. One approach asks when it is appropriate to have one party compensate another, basing this treatment on corrective
justice or the idea that it is inherently "right" to pay for the injury one
causes. The second approach adopts a utilitarian approach to the choice of
a standard of liability, viewing it in economic terms as a manifestation of
wealth maximization principles. Both approaches recognize, albeit for
different reasons, the states' interest in providing compensation for harm to
its citizens.
A number of scholars have argued that courts ought to focus on the moral
or ethical duty to the community as a quasi-criminal function of the community. For example, in his classic essay, Fairnessand Utility in Tort Theory, 36
Professor George Fletcher set the modem terms of the doctrinal debate by
analyzing tort law under two competing paradigms: the "paradigm of reciprocity,' whereby the "victim has a right to recover for injuries caused by a
risk greater in degree and different in order from those created by the victim
and imposed on the defendant," and the "paradigm of reasonableness" which
roughly corresponds to the negligence standard and inquires into the justifiability of the risk created by the defendant's activities.237 Fletcher's idea of
duty rests on the rule of reciprocity, which would require compensation from
a tortfeasor who imposes a nonreciprocal risk on his victim; he would not
234. Community norms do not necessarily include the concept of "fault." Early tort
regimes were strict liability, distinguishing them from criminal law, where fault early on became
an essential element. Fault really entered the tort picture in the early nineteenth century cases
like Brown v. Kendall. As Professor Malone noted, strict liability is the response of society to
specific perils posing a serious threat to its welfare. More flexible tests, including the requirement of a degree of moral culpability or "fault," do not develop until diverse economic and
social needs are sufficiently clustered into "meaningful activity groups" with conflicting needs.
Malone, supra note 220, at 26-27. To put it in Holmeaian terms, strict liability has a normative
element, despite the absence of any culpable mental state - it imposes a duty to avoid, or a
"negative fault."
235. Deep exploration of this debate is beyond the scope of this Article. Moreover, the two
paradigms - fairness and efficiency - are presented to capture the main lines of the arguments,
but certainly many authors have developed nuances or variations of the basic paradigms. For
an overview of the major literature, see FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW (Saul Levmore ed., 1994);
PERSPECTIVES ON TORT LAW (Robert Rabin ed., 4th ad. 1995).
236.
George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537
(1972).
237. Id. at 540, 542.
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require actors who impose reciprocal risks of harm on each other to provide
compensation for harm."
Alternatively, Professor Jules Coleman's concept of duty rests more
squarely on the principle of corrective justice. In his 1992 book, Risks and
Wrongs, Coleman presents corrective justice as the principle that those who
are responsible for the wrongful losses of others have a duty to repair them.239
Coleman's principle of corrective justice finds its basis in a community's
common sense of morality and shared moral and legal practices.240
The alternative to the moral conduct paradigm is the pure economic
analysis epitomized by the Learned Hand formula and Judges Posner's and
Calabresi's writings and decisions. The economic analysis of tort law focuses
on efficiency as the primary goal of the law.24' In the area of negligence, this
means that the law seeks to minimize the combined costs of accidents and
accident avoidance. Just as there may be too many accidents and too little
spent on accident prevention, there may be too much spent on accident prevention and, perhaps contrary to intuition, too few accidents. To efficiently
allocate societal resources of safety and care, the burden of preventing accidents should be plactd on those who can avoid the accident at the lowest cost.
Thus, the judgment of liability depends on a weighing of costs and benefits
and it is less important whether compensation, punishment, or regulation is
the dominant purpose of tort law.
In response to the argument that courts should and generally have focused on fairness in matters of tort law,242 Judge Posner argues that, at least
in this area, fairness equals efficiency.243 A legal system that operates efficiently increases the size of the economic pie.""' The shifing of the total
238. See id.at 542 (discussing regime of liability based on non-reciprocal nature of rights
imposed).
239. See JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 361-85 (1992) (developing theory of
corrective justice based on moral duty to account for wrongs).
240. See Jules Coleman, The Practiceof CorrectiveJustice, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 15,29 (1995)
(discussing effect of legal and political practices on content of duty required by corrective
justice). Professor Weinrib also uses corrective justice as a fundamental principle of tort doctrine. See Ernest J. Weinrib, The Gains and Losses ofCorrective Justice, 44 DUKE L.J. 277,
297 (1994) (arguing that corrective justice is 'key to understanding [tort law]").
241.
See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUcTURE OF TORT LAW (1987) (discussing implications of efficiency in tort law); RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (5th ed. 1998) (same).

242. See William E. Nelson, From Fairness to Efficiency: The Transformation of Tort
Law in New York, 47 BUFF. LAW REV. 117, 118-19(1999) (contrasting views of various normative scholars with those of law and economics scholars).
243. See LANDES & POsNER, supra note 241, at 8-9, 14-19 (arguing that economic efficiency is consistent with notions of fairness).
244. See id. at 16 (commenting that legal system that increases the economic pie is good
from economic perspective).
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expected damages and cost of care toward the optimal minimum point con-

serves the scarce resources of time and money for other uses. This effect may
have a direct result in reduced insurance rates.24 As Judge Posner notes, the
improvement is wealth-maximizing but not necessarily Pareto-superior
because the defendant who is the least cost avoider will be uncompensated. 2"
According to Judge Posner, however, the economic pie will be bigger because
those who directly benefit from the increased efficiency could compensate the
losers.24 Any concerns of unequal distribution are more properly directed to
other branches of government. 2'
This debate suggests that different values, such as efficiency, reciprocity,
and moral norms, may inform tort law in the United States. Further, states may
rely on one or more of these values in operating their tort system. These differences are significant in the application of federalism principles to national
tort reform. Indeed, the dichotomy already has influenced the Court's decision-

making in the area. For example, these-two polar positions are reflected in the
two partial concurrences in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.249 Justice Scalia
took the extreme economic position: not only is any claim derived from the
label itself preempted, but any alternative method of informing the public is
also preempted.250 This is not because the statute so states, but because allow-

ing the states to impose a less economically efficient and thus more onerous
burden on manufacturers would upset the commercial decision made by
251
Congress.
245. See id.at 17 (suggesting efficient regime would lead to reduced insurance rates).
246. See id.(arguing that "winners" could theoretically compensate "losers").
247. Id. at 16-17 (suggesting Kaldor-Hicks wealth maximization rationale produces greater
societal gains but may injure uncompensated individuals). But if wealth maximization is truly
the goal of tort law, in part by redistribution from the generally poorer injured to the generally
richer injurers, it would mean that the highest goals of tort law could be achieved by abolishing
tort law altogether - thereby allowing defendants to externalize even more costs.
248. See id. at 17-18 (suggesting that balancing of efficiency and redistributive considerations is not appropriate inquiry for judiciary). But without the normative element, scholars
argue, this analysis risks degenerating into a system of after-the-fact eminent domain; the person
who can use the property or right in the most economically efficient manner can simply take it.
The victim cannot choose whether he wants to be injured; and if he recovers anything at all, he
gets only the market value of the damaged property or right. At worst, the tortfeasor is no worse
off than if he had not committed the tort, while that recovery is the best possible outcome for
the victim - a topsy-turvy scheme from a moral standpoint. Arguably, some element of punishment, deterrence or sanction is necessary to avoid this result. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Does
"Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the DisappearingTort/CrimeDistinction in
American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 231-33 (1991) (suggesting that private law only prices
conduct, whereas criminal law prohibits).
249. 505 U.S. 504 (1991).
250. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 544 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (finding all claims preempted by federal statutes).
251. See id. at 554-55 (Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing economic concerns considered
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On the other hand, Justice Blackmun argued that although Congress may
have a role to play in the area it cannot oust the states from setting negligence
standards.25 2 Thus, he emphasized the distinction between direct regulation
and tort liability. 253 Even when the states are preempted from the former, the

courts consistently recognize a responsibility to adhere to the societal norms
reflected in the latter. 254 The paradigmatic case, cited approvingly by Justice
Blackmun, is Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co.,255 which concerned a federal
labeling requirement." 6 It states:
Even if Chevron could not alter the [EPA-written] label, Maryland could
decide that, as between a manufacturer and an injured party, the manufacturer ought to bear the cost of compensating for those injuries that could
have been prevented with a more detailed label .... That may in some
sense impose a burden on the sale of paraquat in Maryland, but it is not
equivalent to a direct regulatory command that Chevron change its label.
Chevron can comply with both federal and state law by continuing to use
the EPA-approved label and by simultaneously paying damages to successful tort plaintiffs such as Mr. Ferebee. 5 7
The critical question is whether the redistribution envisioned by the Ferebee court is economic or based on some notion of ethical duty to the community or both. Put another way, the inquiry is whether Maryland's normative
position that manufacturers should pay for the injuries they cause interferes
with Congress's economic interest in promoting the interstate sale of paraquat.

The Buckman preemption case presents a similar dichotomy. 2 8 Writing
for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that allowing state law fraud-

by Congress). As a matter of historical fact, Scalia's interpretation of the statute may well be
the correct one. Some have argued that the statute was a response to pressure from the tobacco
lobby, which secured broad immunity from tort liability - lasting thirty years until just
recently - in exchange for a perfunctory warning.
252. See id. at 537 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting that Court has declined to find state
tort law preempted on numerous occasions).
253. See id. at 536-37 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (discussing effects of direct regulation
versus common-law tort remedies).
254. See id. at 537 (Blackmun J., concurring) (noting that tort law has entirely separate
function from direct regulation - compensation of victims).
255. 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
256. See Cippollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 537 (1991) (Blackmun J.,
concurring) (citing Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1540 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
.257.
See Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1532 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (suing on
theory of strict liability for failure to label chemical, paraquet, properly).
258. See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341,352-53 (2001) (discussing competing federal and state claims to regulate medical devices); supra notes 164-68 and

accompanying text (discussing balancing interests of protecting community and implementing
congressional policy).
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on-the-FDA claims would negatively affect the FDA's flexibility in placing
new devices on the market, would superimpose fifty state tort regimes on the
FDA's own scheme, and would deter manufacturers from seeking approval of
devices with beneficial off-label uses. 59 This would hurt the economically
efficient scheme contemplated by Congress: "[T]he comparatively speedy
§ 510(k) process could encounter delays, which would, in turn, impede
competition among predicate devices and delay health care professionals'
ability to prescribe appropriate off-label uses."2"
Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment but not inthe Court's reasoning, stressed the importance of allowing states to provide a private tort remedy.261 He argued that allowing state damages remedies in an appropriate case
would "supplement and facilitate" the federal enforcement scheme instead of
encroaching upon it; this would not interpret the statutory scheme to preclude
any damages remedy in that situation.26 2 Otherwise, this would leave the
parties injured by fraudulent representations to federal agencies without a
private compensation remedy and upset a normative position that tort victims
should receive compensation for injuries they receive. 6 3
These cases highlight the Court's struggle over whether to let Congress's
interest in promoting national economic efficiency or the states's interest in
providing compensation for harm to its citizens dominate the preemption and
Commerce Clause analysis. This Article turns to an application of these paradigms.
VII Applications of the Paradigmsand Conclusions
We are at a crossroads in federalism jurisprudence. For the past several
years, the Supreme Court has defined more sharply the analysis behind its
federalism decisions. In particular, it has made clear that Congress's power
under the Commerce Clause is not indefinite, imposing limits for the first time
in decades and indicating other situations where those limits may apply. This
jurisprudence will meet new challenges as courts review legislation drafted
in response to the September 11 terrorists attacks. The country immediately
turned to the federal government to marshal a response to the attacks through
legislation. New laws broadening federal power will challenge the federalism
precedents that the Rehnquist Court has carefully nurtured over the last half
259. See Buckman, 351 U.S. at 350 (suggesting state tort claims would deter applicants
from seeking approval of devices for fear of civil liability).
260. Id. at351.
261. See id. at 354-55 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting significance of common law tort
remedies).
262. See id. at 354 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (noting value of state tort remedies).
263. See id. at 355 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting potential lack of remedy).
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decade. Testing them will help define what the Court means by "truly nationar' and "truly local" interests.
Aside from the legislation enacted in response to the terrorist attacks,
reformers increasingly have attempted to implement modem day tort reform
at the federal level through, Congress's Commerce Clause power. Thus far,

no modem federal tort reform effort has been struck down as unconstitutional,
but no major challenge has been mounted yet under the Court's new federalism jurisprudence. Given the new decisions and the strong history of preserving the rights of states to govern matters of local concerns, it is questionable
whether some of the modem federal tort reform efforts will survive application of the new federalism jurisprudence.
This Section attempts to reconcile the competing developments and
proposes a sliding scale model for the examination of federal tort legislation
under the recent federalism decisions. Before doing so, it briefly examines the
traditional justifications for federal tort reform and questions whether they are
based on accurate assumptions.
Reformers usually couch the argument in favor of a national uniform tort

law in terms of fairness. 264 The argument is that basic fairness demands that

the legal system should treat similar cases in a similar fashion. For example,

medical malpractice injuries should be judged similarly regardless of where
they occIr.26 A classic example involves injuries that occur as a result of
Manufacturers of products market their products
defective products. 2'
nationally, not locally, which creates uncertainty as to the liability rules that
will apply once the product is marketed. 267 Commentators argue that this
uncertainty would be greatly diminished if a uniform system of tort rules were
applied.'
These fairness considerations rooted in economic efficiency thus seek to

avoid the inefficiency of applying fifty different product liability schemes.
Predictability allows manufacturers to better understand their obligations and

to theoretically reduce transaction costs. 26 9 As such, one method to moderate
264.

See Roger Transgrud,Federallsm andMass TortLitigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2263,

2270-71 (2000) (indicating that common federal tort reform argument is unfairness of differences in state regimes).
265. Schwartz, supra note 209, at 922.
266. Id. at 924; Pamela M. Mades, Note, To Settlement Classes and Beyond: A Primer on
Proposed Methods for Federalizing Mass Tort Litigation, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 540, 566
(1997).

267.

Id.

268.

See Schwartz, supra note 209, at 925-30; Ackerman, aupra note 6, at 451-56.

269.

Itis unclear whether the wide variation in outcomes in similar tort cases is attributable

to doctrinal differences. Tort law historically has vested a great deal of authority in juries to
determine liability and damages for torlious behavior. The variability of outcomes in tort suits
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differences in outcome would be to apply similar liability rules, hence the

movement for uniform, federal tort legislation. 270 Based on this argument,
recent tort reform efforts have focused on product liability. 2

Although the economic efficiency argument has its appeal, current as
well as historical federal tort reform efforts have been piecemeal and focus on
specific industries or problems, and thus have not involved a vast, interstitial
replacement of the entire body of common law torts.
Instead, Congress
generally has deferred to the states in the area of tort remedies even as it
expanded its role in government regulation. 237 This piecemeal approach has
has often been attributed to differences in jury behavior. See Michael 3. Saks, Do We Really
Know AnythingAbout the Behaviorof the Tort LitigationSystem -And Why Not?, 140 U. PA.
L. REv. 1147, 1243-44 (1992) ("[Alny increase in settlements could easily be the result of
misperceptions about jury behavior. If lawyers and adjusters mistakenly believe that jury
awards are soaring, they will negotiate settlements more favorable to plaintiffs than they need
to or used to."). Indeed, the perception of differences in jury awards has spurred the tort reform
movement in the form of legislative caps on the amounts ofjury awards in certain tort cases.
Even more important, these differences in outcome suggest that perhaps the most effective
way to curtail differences in jury determinations and achieve the goal of uniformity is to
constrain discretion by curtailing jury discretion and investing stronger gatekeeping functions
in the trial judge. See Rabin, supra note 215, at 15 (discussing response of legislative caps on
jury awards); Schwartz, supra note 209, at 928 (commenting on different states' views on jury
role in products liability cases). Indeed, current efforts to federalize tort law have focused
mostly on curtailing remedies rather than affecting doctrine on liability. States have been very
active in this area, but without any degree of uniformity. The degree to which we should
constrain jury discretion is an old debate, see Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. 98, 101 (1934)
(finding jury issue unless facts dictate rule of law), with a resurgence in the recent movement
to polyfurcate complicated mass tort cases and the creation of evidentiary rules spawned by
Daubert,Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 70 (1927) (leaving issues of due
care to jury, but reserving standards of conduct as legal issues). See Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-95 (1993) (creating new evidentiary rules for "expert"
witnesses). Most efforts to impose uniformity through federal legislation come in the form of
caps on recovery of noneconomic loss, elimination of joint and several liability, or making
uniform the responsibility of collateral sources for economic loss. These efforts would allow
uniformity to occur. By definition, a $400,000 cap on noneconomic loss awards would remove
jury discretion to award a greater amount.
270. See Rabin, supra note 215, at 15 (discussing appeal of "legislative limitations on
remedies/damages" in product liability realm).
271.
Cf.Robert Pear, States Diwnayed by FederalBills on Patients' Rights, N.Y. TIMEs,
Aug. 13, 2001, at Al (commenting that health plans and multistate employers want uniform
standards supplied by the proposed Patients' Bill of Rights to provide uniformity in regulation).
272. See Terry Carter, PiecemealTort Reform, A BA. J., Dec. 2001, at 51, 51-53, 69
(suggesting incremental tort reform more successful than comprehensive approach).
273. See Food and Drug Administration Act, § 903(bX2), 21 U.S.C. § 393(bX2) (1994)
(describing FDA's power to regulate prescription drugs); Federal Aviation Administrative
Authorization Act, 49 U.S.C. § 106 (1994) (creating federal regulation of airline industry);
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485, 503 (1996) (noting "presumption against the
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compromised the goal of economic efficiency that a uniform federal tort
system would supply.
Presumably, manufacturers could also avoid uncertainty and unpredictability by hewing to the rules of the single most stringent state. This, however, would give the strictest state control over the nation's safety tort rules.
If the rules are to become de facto national in this way, it would make better
sense for them to be truly national and created in a national forum. But there
does not seem to be judicial or academic analyses of the question of how
manufacturers handle the problem of facing different state
standards, which
24
is what the economic efficiency argument really warrants. 1
Harkening back to the Swift era, proponents of moving product liability
cases from state to federal courts also believe that juries disfavor foreign
manufactuers in state courts. 2 75 Even if such discrimination does exist, it is
unlikely to be avoided by forcing plaintiffs to bring suit in federal court. After
all, in federal and state courts the jurors are drawn from the local community.
Moreover, recent data suggests that federal judges have been more favorable
to products liability plaintiffs than state juries have been.276
Others have pointed out that many of the assumptions underlying the
push for tort reform, either on a state or federal level, stem fiom assumptions
drawn from a few widely reported aberrant cases.Y Despite widespread
publicity, lobbying, and some scholarly and judicial rhetoric to the contrary,
the data are fairly clear that the tort system, at least since the industrial age
and up to the present, strongly favors defendants.27
[federal] pre-emption of state police power regulations and permitting state tort action for
defective medical devices" (citation omitted)); Martin v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 630 So. 2d 1206,
1209 (Fa. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) ("[T~he Federal Aviation Act was not intended to preempt state

common law negligence claims." (citations omitted)).
274. For example, how often do manufacturers face choices in which it is necessary or
useful for their general counsel to sit down with their engineers to design products? Or do
manufacturers handle the variance in state laws simply as a litigation strategy problem by
asking: "What should we argue in this state?"
275. See The Class Action Fairness Act of 2001, H.R. 2341, 107th Cong. § 2(b) (2001)
(seeking to limit power of state courts to adjudicate mass tort actions).
276. See William Glaberson, A Study's Verdict: Jury Awardy Are Not Out of Control,
N.Y. TUES, Aug. 6, 2001, at A9 (discussing study by Professors Theodore Heisenberg and
Martin Wells to be published in Cornell Law Review).
277. Robert A. Prentice& Mark E. Roszkowski, "TortReform" and The Liability "Revolution": DefendingStrictLiabilityin TortforDefective Products, 27 GONZ. L. REV. 251,255-59

(1991) (arguing that perception of tort litigation explosion is incorrect), Deborah L.Rhode, Too
Much Law, Too Little Justice: Too Much Rhetoric, Too LittleReform, I I GEO. J. LEGAL ETEMCS

989,1000-04 (1998) (discussing factors that encourage reporting ofexceptional damage awards).
278. See Saks, supra note 269, at 1281-86 (finding defendants in aggregate impose many
times cost on society and on victim than they are required to compensate).
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Many tort reform efforts focus on limiting damages. Such caps, however,
are arbitrary. It is hard to explain the difference between a cap on medical
malpractice damages of $200,000 and a cap of $300,000 other than as a
response to political pressures. Further, caps are intrinsically unfair. A cap
on intangible loss means that the very seriously injured individual does not
receive compensation for the full extent of his or her intangible injuries.
Imposition of uniformity through nationwide caps on damages only
exacerbates this problem. Furthermore, caps create uniformity from a defense
perspective but not from a victim's perspective. If Congress imposed a cap
on damages related to products liability cases but not as to other accident
cases, a victim of a car accident caused by driver's negligence would be able
to recover the full extent of his or her injuries while a victim of a car accident
caused by a product defect would not. From the victim's perspective, similar
injuries are not treated consistently.
Thus, the assumptions underlying congressional tort reform may be
flawed empirically, or at least wrong in the context of particular states. The
national economic interest may not be served to the extent claimed by the
national tort reform movement - a strong consideration when these efforts
face judgment under the recent federalism decisions.
Even assuming national tort reform efforts are based on accurate assumptions, it still is not clear that they would survive judicial scrutiny because of
the state interests involved. The recent federalism decisions leave open many
questions. Inparticular, they do not sufficiently define what is meant by a
truly local interest. Drawing from the recent federalism jurisprudence, this
Article proposes a two part, sliding scale analysis to deal with these questions
that (1) examines the purpose behind the federal law to see whether it truly
promotes a federal economic interest, and (2) determines whether the federal
tort legislation unconstitutionally infringes upon common law torts, an area
traditionally regulated by the states.279
A. Examining the PurposeBehind and Impact
of the FederalLegislation
In its recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the Court focuses first on
the federal interest Congress attempts to promote in its legislation. Lopez and
that the activity Congress seeks to regulate must constitute
Morrison demand
"commerce. '' 290 Writing for the majority in Morrison,Chief Justice Rehnquist
279. As a result of the recent federalism decisions, Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment may be the power Congress intends to invoke to support tort reform at the federal level,
a federal power not addressed here.
280. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000) (stating that Congress may
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stated: "We ...reject the argument that Congress may regulate non-economic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate
effect on interstate commerce." '' Thus, even assuming that the concerns
raised above that question the underlying assumptions behind federal tort
legislation can be met, one would need to examine further the federal tort
legislation to see whether it serves a true national economic interest or
whether it attempts to regulate a noneconomic endeavor through indirect aggregate effects on interstate commerce. This in turn requires an examination

of the purpose and, critically, the effect of the congressional legislation.
Clearly, each bill and its sections would have to be examined individu-

ally. The Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act creates a
federal civil cause of action, removes the need to prove negligence, and
authorizes payment to claimants for physical injuries or death related to the
September 11 terrorist attacks. 2 Congress made clear in passing this legislation that it was concerned about the financial status of the air carrier industry
and thus took several measures, including the creation of a federal civil cause

of action and the limitation of the industry's liability to insurance coverage,
to ensure that the industry would survive.2 Thus, submitting a claim waives
the right to file a civil action in tort'for damages, eliminates any claim for
punitive damages, removes the right to appeal an award to a court, and caps
the total liability for the claims against the industry at the limits of the airlines
carriers' liability coverage."'
In contrast to the gun regulation at issue in Lopez, this is not an attempt
to regulate noneconomic conduct based on indirect aggregate effects on
commerce. 2 5 Air transportation is a classic example of interstate, economic
commercial activity. On its face, creating a claims procedure is directly
not regulate noneconomic criminal conduct); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)
(requiring that conduct regulated affect interstate commerce).
,281. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617.
282. See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42,
§§ 401-409, 115 Stat. 230 (2001) (to be codified at49 U.S.C. § 40101) (limiting victims' right
to recover tort damages from air carriers).
283. See id. § 408 (creating federal cause of action and capping liability to extent of
insurance coverage)., Similarly, liability has been limited to insurance coverage for suits related
to the terrorist attacks for aircraft manufacturers, airports, and owners of the World Trade
Center. See Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 201, 115 Stat.
597, 645-647 (2001) (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101) (limiting liability for terrorist

attacks).
284. See id. §§ 405 & 408 (eliminating right to sue in tort punitive damages, right to
appeal, and capping total liability).
285. Cf Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (discussing noneconomic "criminal" nature of Gun-Free
Schools Act).
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related to protection of that commercial activity - it is not hard to fathom that
without such protection the airline industry would be in serious trouble.2" 6 In
its haste to pass the legislation, however, Congress did not compile a strong
record of the interstate economic impact of tort claims on the industry, which
the Garrett decision seems to require.'
As applied, the federal economic
interest promoted by the claims facility could be undernined depending on the
number of claimants who opt to pursue their claims individually in state court.
Despite these shortcomings, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act
seems to meet the first part of the Commerce Clause analysis.
Similarly, what if federal legislation seeks solely to limit compensatory
damages against one industry in order to encourage development of the industry? In limiting damages against nuclear power plant operators, the potential
for an unanticipatible scale of actual damages that could prevent the development of nuclear energy concerned Congress.' As a result, it imposed a limit
which it acknowledged would almost certainly be too low to compensate the
victims fully." 9 Nineteenth century courts systematically undercompensated
tort victims for an analogous reason: because the capital owner (the injurer)
could put the money to better economic use than the worker (the victim), as
much money as possible should be left in the hands of the defendants.2' In
this instance, determining the appropriate level of redistribution from tortfeasors to victims for purposes beyond deterrence and compensation seems closer

to serving a national economic interest - i.e., one that would pass muster
under the new federalism jurisprudence and is less connected to the moral
conduct at which state tort systems are aimed.
The stated purpose ofthe Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform
Act - likely to be a model for future federal tort reform legislation - was to
286. Of course, individuals still have the option to pursue their claims in state or federal
court, so the industry may not have escaped the problem.
287.
See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text (discussing Garrett's requirement that
Congress establish appropriate exercise of authority through record).
288. See Atomic Energy Damages Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1994) (limiting liability of
nuclear power plants); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 8386 (1978) (upholding Congress's enactment of legislation that enforced $560 million cap on
damages and required waiver of defenses by indemnitors in event of nuclear catastrophe).
289. See Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 84-85 (discussing Congress's realization that statutory
cap would not assure full compensation). Similar legislation has been passed to protect
manufacturers of vaccines. See National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C.
§ 300aa-1 3 (1994) (detailing procedure for securing compensation under vaccination programs).
290. See HALL,supra note 218, at 125 (indicating that placement of burden on victims freed
"capital for further business investment... [providing] indirect subsidy for early industrial
expansion"). But see Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century
America: A Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717, 1743 (1980) (discussing development of res
ipsa loquitor doctrine and liability imposed on railroads).
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impose standards on manufacturers of products that cause harm.9 The congressional findings concluded: "The rules of law governing product liability
actions, damage awards, and allocations of liability have evolved inconsistently within and among the states, resulting in a complex, contradictory, and
uncertain regime that is inequitable to both plaintiffs and defendants and
unduly burdens interstate commerce."2" Congress, obviously with an eye
toward meeting the Lopez test, also concluded that the "national scope of the
problems created by the defects in the civil justice system" made it impossible
"for the States to enact laws that fully and effectively respond to those problems" and that there existed a "need to restore rationality, certainty, and
fairness to the civil justice system in order to protect against excessive,
arbitrary, and uncertain damage awards and to reduce the volume, costs, and
delay of litigation." 2 3 Although, as discussed above, it is questionable that
the assumptions underlying these reforms are accurate, there is no doubt that
Congress tried to define a national economic problem and propose a national
solution to the "product liability crisis." Because the equity argument Congress cited really is an efficiency argument, it seems to serve a national
economic purpose, assuming this litany would be 'sufficient without more
specific congressional findings on the relationship between product liability
litigation and interstate commerce. 2
Other areas are grayer. For example, assume that Congress enacted a
federal tort statute solely for the goal of limiting punitive damages. 295 The
Common Sense Product Liability Act included a cap on punitive damages equal
to the greater of two times the sum of the amount awarded to the claimant for
economic loss and noneconomic loss or $250,000.29 The proposed cap
sparked a strong reaction from its supporters and detractors. As one commentator observed, "The plaintiffs' bar (and their congressional supporters), ardently
defended a public policy device intended to deter and punish wrongdoing,
291.

See Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of 1996, H.R. 956, 104th

Cong. § 52(b) (1996) (seeking to impose "uniform legal principles of product liability").

292. 142 Cong. Rec. S. 2587 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hollings).
293. Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of 1996, H.R. 956, 104th Cong.
§2(aX8), (10) (1996).
294. But see Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. GOavtt, 531 U.S. 356,368-74 (2001) (finding
congressional record compiled to show history and pattern of employment discrimination by
states inadequate to justify abrogating state sovereign immunity).
295. Although the final version of the Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act
of 1996 would have curbed punitive damages in products liability cases, earlier versions
included a provision to curb punitive damages in all civil cases brought in any federal or state
court on any theory. See H.R. 956, 104th Cong. §§ 201-202.
296. See Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of 1996, H.R. 956, 104th
Cong. § 108 (imposing cap on tort damages).
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while champions of the cap vigorously argued in favor of curbing excessive,
arbitrary, and unpredictable punitive damage awards."'
This observation
succinctly summarizes the state and federal issues at stake here - the promotion
of deterrence and punishment that reflects the local interest in regulating
individual behavior, and the curbing of unpredictable punitive damages that
reflects a national interest in ensuring an efficient national economy.
It is not entirely clear whether a cap on punitive damages actually achieves
the result it seeks.29 Assuming it does, the critical question is whether it
promotes a national economic interest and regulates economic activity. Is the
purpose of a federal cap on punitive damages to set an optimal level of deterrence or does it seek to protect an industry or profession regardless of the
appropriate level of deterrence? A comparison to criminal law is apt. Setting
the appropriate level of punishment for adequate deterrence has a strong normsetting element aimed at noneconomic activity, which traditionally is within the
province of state criminal law and outside the realm of federal legislation.
Similarly, ifthe purpose and effect of federal tort legislation is to set an appropriate level of punishment for deterrence, it targets noneconomic activity and
thus justifies a major role for the states in setting punitive damages, with Congress's role in the scheme directed at ensuring proportionality under the due
process clause. On the other hand, if the purpose and effect of the cap is to
protect a particular industry or certain defendants from liability to ensure the
free-flow of interstate commerce, regardless ofdeterrence - as in the case ofthe
Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, which eliminates
punitive damages altogether with regard to certain claims - then it is more
likely aimed at the economic activity contemplated in the recent federalism
decisions.
Another provision of the Product Liability Legal Reform Act raises an
example. It limits a defendant's responsibility in products liability actions for
noneconomic loss to that which is in direct proportion to the defendant's
percentage of responsibility for the harm caused to the plaintiff, i.e., it makes
each defendant's share several and not joint.2 The vast majority of states
have adopted some form of comparative fault and have abolished joint and
297. Lebow, supra note 78, at 674.
298. See Kimberly A. Pace, Recalibrating the Scales ofJustice Through National Punitive
Damage Reform, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1573, 1623 (1997) (arguing that capping punitive damages
at arbitrary amount would hamper efficiency of tort system); Nancy L. Manzer, Note, 1986 Tort
Reform Legislation: A Systematic Evaluation of Caps on Damages and Limitations on Joint
and SeveralLiability, 73 CoRNELLL. REv. 628,650 (commenting that arbitrary caps undervalue
noneconomic damages).
299. See Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of 1996, H.R. 956, 104th
Cong. § 110 (1996) (providing several liability for tortfeasors).
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several liability, which reflects a change in philosophy regarding compensation of the victim at almost any cost as opposed to achieving a "fairer" result
3°° Conto the defendant; however, the states' approaches are not uniform.
gress would need to demonstrate that imposing uniformity on the law regardliability promotes a national economic interest to pass judicial
ing several
30 1
muster.
Thus, to determine whether federal tort legislation serves a direct national economic interest, federalism jurisprudence requires a critical examination of the purpose and effect of the federal legislation which ensures that the
activity in question is an economic endeavor. Such examination should reveal
that the immediate subject of regulation has a direct, substantial impact on
interstate commerce, along with congressional findings of fact to substantiate
that claim. Federal tort legislation that regulates a commercial area with
direct economic impact - such as the airline industry - will fare better than
legislation directed at individual activity - such as medical malpractice.
B. Areas Traditionally Dedicated to State Regulation
Even assuming that the federal legislation passes the threshold of constitutionality because it substantially affects interstate commerce, the Court's
inquiry does not end there. In its recent federalism jurisprudence, particularly
in the cases arising under the Tenth Amendment, the Court indicated that
states have a constitutional interest in regulating certain "local" matters.
Regardless of whether these areas of state powers come from either the letter
or the spirit of the Constitution, the Court has emphasized that a finding of
traditional state regulations merits special inquiry under Commerce Clause
analysis, although it has not fully explained how to conduct that inquiry.3"
300. See Lebow, supra note 78, at 676 (listing examples of differences among states with
regard to joint and several liability).
Similarly, the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act and the Aviation
301.
and Transportation Security Act both limit the liability of certain industries to insurance coverage
for incidents related to the September 11 terrorist attacks. Presumably, capping damages in this
fashion is designed to protect specific industries from excessive liability that would hurt the
national economy and in that way is aimed at promoting national economic activity.
Limitation of attorneys fees is another area often suggested for tort reform. Again, the
question is whether such a limitation would serve a national economic interest. Here, the connection to interstate commerce appears more indirect and may be struck down under Lopez and
its progeny.
302. This Article is agnostic as to whether there exists areas of exclusive state powers, an
issue that has been debated at length. See Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional
Federalism, 74 TEX. L. REV. 795, 798 (1996) ("Chafleng[ing] . . . fundamental premise by
claiming that the existence of areas of exclusive state power is not a necessary condition of
constitutional federalism."); see also Garcia v. San Antonio Metro Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528,
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Under the model proposed below, the level of scrutiny applied to the asserted
federal action is much greater if the area Congress seeks to regulate is one
traditionally governed by the states. Thus, as the strength of the state interest
infringed upon increases, the strength of the federal interest asserted correspondingly must be greater to constitutionally displace the state interest.
Determining whether creation of tort remedies is an area traditionally
dedicated to state regulation such that it would inhibit federal legislation
under the Commerce Clause is a complicated inquiry that depends on the
analysis of various subsidiary issues. First, the Court has indicated that
certain areas traditionally dedicated to state regulation involve core local
interests that are specially protected against federal encroachment. Criminal
legislation is one of the areas of state sovereignty that has been given special
protection. 3 Although Congress certainly is empowered to create federal
crimes, the Court does not usually find that federal law preempts states from
creating their own crimes covering the same criminal activity." Property law
and family law are two other areas of regulation traditionally cited as local in
nature. 305 Thus, it is critical to examine whether tort law should be viewed in
the same way.
In examining whether tort law is comparable to the other areas of state
sovereignty worthy of special protection, the critical analysis lies in how one
views the main purpose of tort law. As discussed above, two primary approaches have emerged - the moral conduct view and the pure economic
analysis approach.
552 (1985) ("State sovereign interests, then, are more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially created limitations on
federal power."). Nor is this discussion an attempt to return to the days of dual federalism. See
supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text (discussing possible revival of dual federalism) If
these state powers are considered exclusive, then a finding of exclusivity would always trump
federal encroachment; if state powers are considered important but less than exclusive, the
sliding scale model presented here would be triggered.
303. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (stating that "criminal law
enforcement" is area in which "States historically have been 'sovereign"). In Printz, the Court
struck the provision of the Brady Bill requiring local law-enforcement officials to assist in the
administration of a federal firearms statute as "commandeering." Prinlz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898,933-35 (1997). And last Term in Jones v. United States, the Court held that a person
accused of violating the statute that made arson a federal crime could not be convicted, even
though he had thrown a Molotov cocktail into a home, because the act concerned a building not
being used in interstate commerce in any active sense. The Court observed that arson is "traditionally local criminal conduct," indeed "a paradigmatic common-law state crime." Jones v.
United States, 529 U.S. 848, 858 (2000).
304. In fact, research did not reveal any example of preemption of state crimes.
305. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text (discussing Court's concern that Congress should not preempt state exercise of traditional police powers).
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If tort law is predominantly based on economics, then regulating tort law
at the federal level aligns closely with the federal interest in regulating economic activity (assuming the activity has an effect on interstate commerce).
The stronger the economic element in tort law, the stronger the argument for
a substantial, even dominant role for Congress in the tort system, given its
power to regulate national economic interests.
However, the recognition of an irreducible moral or ethical imperative
in tort law reaches the heart of the exercise of state sovereign power, giving
the states an irreducible role to play as co-equal norm setters in our federal
system. Insofar as state tort law serves this normative function, it is closer to
the other areas granted special protection, particularly to criminal law. In that
case, Congress's power to federalize tort law is subject to greater scrutiny
under the recent federalism decisions.
Most federal tort reform proposals are piecemeal; they either limit the
amount or type of damages available to the victim of certain tortious behavior.
However, sometimes they replace the common law tort system altogether with
regard to claims against one industry or for a single mass accident, as in the
Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act.3°6 If a claimant opts
to use the federal compensation system, the federal system becomes "the
exclusive remedy for damages arising out of the hijacking and subsequent
crashes" of the airplanes, thus replaces a common law action in tort for
compensatory and punitive damages." ° Significantly, Congress left open the
option of filing a tort action individually, thereby allowing claimants to go
outside the federal claims system. 3°8

That Congress left the victims with the option of pursuing a state remedy
is significant because it leaves state powers intact. Creating a parallel civil
remedy system is similar to the way Congress has approached the area of
criminal law which preserves much of the states' role as primary norm setter.
More troublesome are the situations where congressional legislation removes
the common law tort remedy completely without providing any federal

remedy to replace it.3

In that situation, the states' interest runs high and the

federal law would be subject to greater scrutiny.
306. See generally Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No.
107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (2001) (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. 40101) (preempting common law tort
system for September 11 disaster).
307. Id. § 408(bXl).
308. Id.
309. This concern has provoked a running debate in preemption cases where preemption
would deny the state altogether the ability to redress tortious behavior. In that situation, the
state's interest runs high and the federal law would be subject to greater scrutiny. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,487 (1996) (quoting refrain from Silkwood that it was "diffi-
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More difficult is the situation in which the federal legislation removes the
common law tort action but creates a federal cause of action. Here, the state
interest in setting standards of behavior for and providing compensation to its
citizens may not be as compelling. Both morally or economically based
principles may inform the state tort law in providing a remedy. Even if providing a tort remedy is driven by efficiency values, those values may not align
with the national economic efficiency values promoted by the federal legislation. From the state common law point of view, putting an industry out of
business through tort judgments may be an efficient solution which may not
be considered an efficient result from the federal point of view. In that case,
the sliding scale probably would err in favor of congressional action, countenancing encroachment on state tort regulation. If Congress demonstrates that

the interstate economic interest in preserving an industry has strong national
economic impact, it would outweigh the states' interest in ensuring that its
citizens receive adequate compensation for harms suffered by tortfeasors and
that tortfeasors are adequately deterred.
Federal legislation that caps punitive damages is a common proposal. As
noted above, the Common Sense Product Liability Act would have capped
punitive damages" 0 and both versions of the proposed Patients' Bill of Rights
would set limits for punitive damages."' Again, the critical inquiry is whether
the tort law the federal legislation replaces is morally or economically based.
Punitive damages are intended to deter and punish wrongdoing and can be
cult to believe that Congress would, without comment, remove all means of judicial recourse
for those injured by illegal conduct"); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 542
(1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (failing to accept that "Congress, without any mention of
state common-law damages actions or of its intention dramatically to expand the scope of
federal pre-emption, would have eliminated the only means ofjudicial recourse for those injured
by cigarette manufacturers' unlawful conduct."); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238,
251 (1984) (discussing absence of language in legislative history of Atomic Energy Act even
considering precluding state law remedies for accidents in nuclear plants, for "[tihis silence
takes on added significance in light of Congress' failure to provide any federal remedy for
persons injured by such conduct. It is difficult to believe that Congress would, without
comment, remove all means of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct."); San
Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 253 (1959) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(noting that "the Court's opinion.., cuts deeply into the ability of States to furnish an effective
remedy under their own laws for the redress of past nonviolent tortious conduct which is not
federally protected, but which may be deemed to be.. . federally prohibited").
More recently, with regard to the proposed Patients' Bill of Rights, state officials have
begun to express concern that the congressional legislation may override protections already in
place under state law for consumers. See Pear, supra note 271, at Al (reporting concerns of
state officials).
310.
See supra note 5 (listing effects of proposed legislation).
311.
See supra note 4 (noting limits on punitive damages imposed by both versions).
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traced directly back to tort law's roots in criminal law. In allowing punitive
damages, it seems that the state acts closer to its traditional function as a local
norm-setter of morally acceptable behavior, akin to its common law role in
criminal law. Thus, the strong state interest would demand an even stronger
federal interest to overcome the special protection warranted by the state role
being replaced. Congress would bear a higher burden to show exactly how
critical it is to the national economy to impose uniform standards of punitive
damages with regard to health plans or products manufacturing.
VIII. Conclusion
In the end, if proposals such as the Common Sense Products Liability Act
survive scrutiny under the recent federalism decisions, we may see the federal
courts return to the days of Swift when the law courts applied in tort and other
cases was federal rather than state generated. The advantages to this swing
may include greater uniformity and predictability of application of tort law.
These advantages, however, may come at the expense of principles of federalism. Federal rules may be less responsive to local interests. Accordingly, the
states as laboratories may have less opportunity to experiment and explore
new doctrine.
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